Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104446 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-41
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
Many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed. I model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes, they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs. I then test the effects of voluntary disclosure in two separate empirical analyses. First, I confirm that voluntary disclosure mechanisms increase tax evasion, using the introduction of the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the U.S. for identification. Second, I quantify the tax revenues of voluntary disclosures by considering how some state-level governments in Germany bought whistle-blower data from foreign bank employees, thereby increasing the detection probability and the usage of voluntary disclosures.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax evasion
voluntary disclosure
self-reporting
JEL: 
H26
K42
H24
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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