Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104206 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2006-9
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
There is strong evidence that in bargaining situations with asymmetric outside options people exhibit self-serving biases concerning their fairness judgements. Moreover, psychological literature suggests that this can be a driving force of bargaining impasse. This paper extends the notion of inequity aversion to incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options and analyses whether this leads to bargaining breakdown. I distinguish between sophisticated and naive agents, that is, those agents who understand their bias and those who do not. I find that breakdown in ultimatum bargaining results from naiveté of the proposers.
Schlagwörter: 
fairness perceptions
self-serving bias
inequity aversion
ultimatum bargaining
outside options
JEL: 
A13
C7
D63
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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