Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103848 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 13-12
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.
Schlagwörter: 
exclusive dealing
exclusive provision
JEL: 
D86
L13
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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