Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103732 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CAWM Discussion Paper No. 74
Publisher: 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM), Münster
Abstract: 
Search frictions are regarded as a major impediment to active competition in many markets. In some markets, such as financial and retail gasoline, governments and consumer protection agencies call for compulsory price reporting. Consumers could then more easily compare the firms' offers. We showthat for a given level of price comparison, mandatory price reporting indeed generally benefits consumers. Such regulation, however, feeds back into firms' strategies, resulting in lower levels of price comparison in equilibrium. This effect may dominate so that the regulation lead to higher expected market prices.
Subjects: 
Mixed Strategies
Price Comparison
Regulation
JEL: 
D83
L13
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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