Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103147 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5007
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We show the effects of the bargaining power of labour unions on product innovation under decentralised and centralised wage bargaining. In this context, we show the implications of preference function, which affects the market size. A higher union bargaining power increases innovation if bargaining is decentralised, the market expansion effect is weak and the cost of innovation is moderate but low. Otherwise, a higher union bargaining power reduces innovation. Hence, whether a higher union bargaining power increases or decreases product innovation depends on the type of wage bargaining, market expansion effect and the cost of innovation.
Subjects: 
centralised union
decentralised union
product innovation
union utility
JEL: 
D43
J51
L13
O31
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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