Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103137 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5012
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP-holders' ability to hold-up is constrained by the prospect of the court-imposed license terms in case of disputes, but is not completely eliminated. Possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of the SEP-holders are discussed.
Subjects: 
standard essential patents
FRAND
injunctions. hold-up
patent litigation
JEL: 
K41
L24
O30
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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