Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103112 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5014
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout in an election with common value and uncertainty. Our model yields distinctive comparative statics results. First, an increase in the proportion of informed citizens may cause the winning margin for the right candidate to either rise or fall. In addition such increase can have a non-monotonic effect on turnout of uninformed citizens. Second, as the prior becomes more favourable towards the ex ante favoured candidate, turnouts of informed and uninformed voters both change in a non-monotonic way. Furthermore, total turnout can be positively or negatively correlated with winning margins.
Subjects: 
regret
voter turnout
behavioural political economy
psychology and economics
uninformed voters
informed voters
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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