Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103010 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2014/086
Publisher: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Abstract: 
This paper presents the case of World Bank support to the mass titling component of the Cambodia Land Management and Administration Project. This was a project for which there was clear national demand, as evidenced by the fact that the Cambodian government had already attempted to implement mass titling a decade previously, but had lacked the human and technical resources to complete it. The case describes a consensus between donors and a host nation government during the planning and approval of the intervention, which dissolves into conflict during implementation. Ultimately, the case raises questions about the ethics of intervention. When governments want approximately the rules of the game suggested by donors (functioning institutions to facilitate markets) but do not want a level playing field, how should this be understood and resolved? Must donors always be passively complicit in elite projects until domestic politics hold them accountable to their own rules?
Subjects: 
Social spending
human development
aggregate welfare
child mortality
developing countries
JEL: 
O29
P26
P32
Q15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-807-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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