Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/1026
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSiebert, Horsten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:16:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:16:38Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/1026-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes how the next financial crisis can be prevented and whichrole the IMF should play. The paper distinguishes between the improvement ofexisting instruments and solving the moral hazard problem. Both issues areinterrelated. The size of operation of the IMF creates a moral hazard problem.The IMF should credibly announce the ex-post rules for bridging a liquidity gapin order to set the right ex-ante incentives for the behavior of debtors andcreditors. An institutional design for dealing with private and sovereign debtanalogous to national bankruptcy rules has to be developed.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Papers |x870-
dc.subject.jelF00-
dc.subject.jelF02-
dc.subject.jelF33-
dc.subject.jelF34-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.stwInternationales Währungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Krediten_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwWährungskriseen_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.subject.stwGlaubwürdigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleThe future of the IMF : how to prevent the next global financial crisisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:870-
dc.identifier.printppn247314935en_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
221.96 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.