Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102643 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 217
Verlag: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as symmetry. Players tend to contribute the same proportion of their respective endowment. In a strongly asymmetric setting, where one player has a higher endowment than the three other players together, we observe significantly lower group contributions than in the other settings. The super-rich player does not contribute significantly more than what the others contribute on average and thus a much lower proportion of the endowment.
Schlagwörter: 
experimental economics
linear public good
income heterogeneity
JEL: 
C92
D63
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
575.4 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.