Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102642 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 218
Publisher: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Abstract: 
In this paper, we investigate in a controlled laboratory experiment physician behavior in the case of payment heterogeneity. In the experiment, each physician provides medical care to patients whose treatments are paid for either under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). We observe that physicians customize care in response to the payment system. A FFS patient receives considerably more medical care than the corresponding CAP patient with the same illness and treatment preference. Physicians over-serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction in the experiment we observe neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover into the treatment of FFS patients.
Subjects: 
experimental economics
physician reimbursement
capitation
Fee-For-Service
customization
fee regulation
JEL: 
C91
I12
I18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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