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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1996
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II No. 304
Verlag: 
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft, Konstanz
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper analyzes the conditions under which the smaller of two otherwise identical countries prefers the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to a situation of fully harmonized tax rates. A standard two-country model of capital tax competition is extended by allowing for transaction costs, additional countries, and additional tax instruments. The effects of introducing either mobility costs or a wage tax instrument are theoretically ambiguous because they lower both the costs and the benefits of non-cooperation from the perspective of the small country. Numerical simulations indicate, however, that for a wide range of parameter values all model extensions considered reduce the possibility that the small country gains from tax competition.
JEL: 
H73
H77
F15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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