Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100525 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Firms and Wages No. D02-V1
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
The possibility of adverse selection by training firms is common theoretical argument for company-sponsored investments in general skills. The paper derives a public and a private signal after apprenticeship training and shows that training firms are able to positively select graduates they keep. The public signal has a stronger impact on entry wages of employer changers than for stayers and private signals shows exactly the opposite pattern.
JEL: 
J24
J31
M52
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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