Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100373 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Industrial Organization V No. E11-V2
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
Commercial ceilings not only restrict broadcasters in their decisions about commercial broadcasting time, but also affect their differentiation of program content. This study examines the welfare effects of commercial ceilings in a two-sided free-to-air TV market, taking into account welfare with respect to content differentiation. We identify a second-best commercial ceiling that maximizes welfare in the absence of enforceable program content regulation and identify the situations in which laissez faire is optimal. The deregulation of commercial broadcasting can improve welfare, even if the laissez-faire level of commercial broadcasting time is excessive.
JEL: 
L82
M38
D61
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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