Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100336 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Capital Accumulation No. F05-V2
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
Why do some economic systems depend on bank financing while others rely on capital markets and bond financing? We propose a political economy model in which elites favor a bank-based system, which increases their rents due to reduced competition. If suffrage is restricted to the elite, this will result in poor corporate control rights and more reliance on banks that offer substitute mechanisms of corporate governance. The lack of legal rights in history triggers path dependencies and explains the dominance of banks until this day. We test the model's predictions by tracking the emergence and evolution of the bank-based financial system in Germany since the 19th century.
JEL: 
D72
O16
P16
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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