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    <title>EconStor Community: Center for Analytical Economics (CAE), Cornell University</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64624</link>
    <description>Center for Analytical Economics (CAE), Cornell University</description>
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      <title>Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70473</link>
      <description>Title: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Majumdar, Mukul; Radner, Roy
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This note reports part of a larger study of petty corruption by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are socially efficient, and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Default estimation and expert information: All likely dataset analysis and robust validation</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70472</link>
      <description>Title: Default estimation and expert information: All likely dataset analysis and robust validation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Kiefer, Nicholas M.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Default is a rare event, even in segments in the midrange of a bank's portfolio. Inference about default rates is essential for risk management and for compliance with the requirements of Basel II. Most commercial loans are in the middle-risk categories and are to unrated companies. Expert information is crucial in inference about defaults. A Bayesian approach is proposed and illustrated using a prior distribution assessed from an industry expert. The method of All Likely Datasets, based on sufficient statistics and expert information, is used to characterize likely datasets for analysis. A check of robustness is illustrated with an e-mixture of priors.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Default estimation, correlated defaults, and expert information</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70471</link>
      <description>Title: Default estimation, correlated defaults, and expert information
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Kiefer, Nicholas M.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Capital allocation decisions are made on the basis of an assessment of creditworthiness. Default is a rare event for most segments of a bank's portfolio and data information can be minimal. Inference about default rates is essential for efficient capital allocation, for risk management and for compliance with the requirements of the Basel II rules on capital standards for banks. Expert information is crucial in inference about defaults. A Bayesian approach is proposed and illustrated using prior distributions assessed from industry experts. A maximum entropy approach is used to represent expert information. The binomial model, most common in applications, is extended to allow correlated defaults yet remain consistent with Basel II. The application shows that probabilistic information can be elicited from experts and econometric methods can be useful even when data information is sparse.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How sapient is homo economicus? The evolutionary origins of trade, ethics and economic rationality</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70470</link>
      <description>Title: How sapient is homo economicus? The evolutionary origins of trade, ethics and economic rationality
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Basu, Kaushik; Guha, Ashok
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The paper argues that economism and, in particular, the individual drive to maximize utility and amass profit are not enough to ensure the efficient functioning of an economy; and that even for elementary economic activities, such as trade, exchange and contracting to occur smoothly, it is essential that human beings be endowed with appropriate social norms, such as a critical level of trustworthiness. This, in turn, implies that an economy's development can depend significantly on whether the citizenry is endowed with the relevant norms. Where these norms come from and how they gather stability remain open questions, though we can get some important insights from theories of evolutionary processes.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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