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    <title>EconStor Collection: ARTNeT Working Paper Series, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64247</link>
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      <title>Impact of information technology in trade facilitation on small and medium-sized enterprises in Bangladesh</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64317</link>
      <description>Title: Impact of information technology in trade facilitation on small and medium-sized enterprises in Bangladesh
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hossain, Syed Saifuddin; Deb, Uttam; Al Amin, Muhammad</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Import tariffs and export subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A small-country approach</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64316</link>
      <description>Title: Import tariffs and export subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A small-country approach
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Potipiti, Tanapong
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper develops a simple small-country model to explain why the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits export subsidies but allows import tariffs. Governments choose protection rates (import tariffs/export subsidies) to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and lobbying contributions. While transportation costs decrease due to the progress of trade liberalization and lower transportation costs, import-competing sectors decline but export industries grow. In the growing export industries, the surplus generated by protection is eroded by new entrants. Therefore, the rent that governments gain from protecting the export sectors by using export subsidies is small. On the other hand, in the import-competing sectors, capital is sunk and no new entrants erode the protection rent. Therefore, governments can get large political contributions from protecting these import-competing sectors. This paper shows that under fast capital mobility, governments with a high bargaining power are better off than with a trade agreement that allows import tariffs but prohibits export subsidies.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2011 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>A snapshot of contemporary protectionism: How important are the murkier forms of trade discrimination?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64315</link>
      <description>Title: A snapshot of contemporary protectionism: How important are the murkier forms of trade discrimination?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Evenett, Simon J; Wermelinger, Martin</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2009 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement and the agriculture sector in Sri Lanka</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64314</link>
      <description>Title: Trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement and the agriculture sector in Sri Lanka
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hirimuthugodage, Dilani</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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