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      <title>Aggregate savings when individual income varies</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56377</link>
      <description>Title: Aggregate savings when individual income varies
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Flodén, Martin
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper examines aggregate savings in a general equilibrium model where infinitely lived households face volatile (and possibly uncertain) income paths, hold a risk-free asset, and face a liquidity constraint. I first show that the equilibrium capital stock in an economy without uncertainty, but where individual income varies, can be larger than in an economy where each household's income is constant. When income is stochastic, the equilibrium capital stock is always larger than when income is constant. This additional capital accumulation has sometimes been interpreted as precautionary savings, but I demonstrate that it is mostly generated by permanent-income motives.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gender and cooperation in children: Experiments in Colombia and Sweden</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56376</link>
      <description>Title: Gender and cooperation in children: Experiments in Colombia and Sweden
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo; Dreber, Anna; von Essen, Emma; Ranehill, Eva
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We compare how children aged 9-12 in Colombia and Sweden cooperate in a Prisoner's Dilemma. We introduce a new measurement device for cooperation that can be easily understood by children. There is some evidence of more cooperation in Sweden than in Colombia. Girls in Colombia are less cooperative than boys, whereas our results indicate the opposite in Sweden. Girls are in general more cooperative with boys than with girls. Relating cooperation to competitiveness, this appears to be task and country dependent.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56375</link>
      <description>Title: Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: A distinctive feature of humans compared to other species is the high rate of cooperation with non-kin. One explanation is that humans are motivated by concerns for social esteem. In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact of anticipated verbal feedback on altruistic behavior. We study pairwise interactions in which one subject, the divider, decides how to split a sum of money between herself and a recipient. Thereafter, the recipient can send an unrestricted anonymous message to the divider. The subjects' relationship is anonymous and one-shot to rule out any reputation effects. Compared to a control treatment without feedback messages, donations increase substantially when recipients can communicate. With verbal feedback, the fraction of zero donations decreases from about 40% to about 20%, and there is a corresponding increase in the fraction of equal splits from about 30% to about 50%. Recipients who receive no money almost always express disapproval of the divider, sometimes strongly and in foul language. Following an equal split, almost all recipients praise the divider. The results suggest that anticipated verbal rewards and punishments play a role in promoting altruistic behavior among humans.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>A necessary and sufficient condition for the strict stationarity of a family of GARCH processes</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56374</link>
      <description>Title: A necessary and sufficient condition for the strict stationarity of a family of GARCH processes
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Meitz, Mika
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We consider a family of GARCH(1,1) processes introduced in He and Teräsvirta (1999a). This family contains various popular GARCH models as special cases. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a strictly stationary solution is given.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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