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    <title>EconStor Community: Arbeitsstelle Internationale Politische Ökonomie, Freie Universität Berlin</title>
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      <title>Legitimacy in global governance of sovereign default: The role of international investment agreements</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69633</link>
      <description>Title: Legitimacy in global governance of sovereign default: The role of international investment agreements
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Brahms, Lisa
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration under international investment agreements in sovereign debt restructuring. The paper presents mechanisms governing sovereign default generally, namely collective action clauses and informal negotiation in the London and Paris clubs and then discusses how sovereign debt restructuring is governed by IIAs, looking at how the clauses affect restructuring. Taking the conception of legitimacy in global governance by Buchanan and Keohane as a theoretical framework, the legitimacy of IIAs as a mechanism of governing sovereign debt disputes is questioned, looking at the aspects transparency, accountability, minimal moral acceptability, institutional integrity and comparative benefit. It is concluded that investor-state dispute settlement on the basis of IIAs lacks legitimacy to decide on sovereign debt restructuring.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Legitimacy in global governance of sovereign default: The role of international investment agreements</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69633</link>
      <description>Title: Legitimacy in global governance of sovereign default: The role of international investment agreements
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Brahms, Lisa
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration under international investment agreements in sovereign debt restructuring. The paper presents mechanisms governing sovereign default generally, namely collective action clauses and informal negotiation in the London and Paris clubs and then discusses how sovereign debt restructuring is governed by IIAs, looking at how the clauses affect restructuring. Taking the conception of legitimacy in global governance by Buchanan and Keohane as a theoretical framework, the legitimacy of IIAs as a mechanism of governing sovereign debt disputes is questioned, looking at the aspects transparency, accountability, minimal moral acceptability, institutional integrity and comparative benefit. It is concluded that investor-state dispute settlement on the basis of IIAs lacks legitimacy to decide on sovereign debt restructuring.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Politische Diskursnetzwerke und der Konflikt um das Anti-Piraterie-Abkommen ACTA</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68144</link>
      <description>Title: Politische Diskursnetzwerke und der Konflikt um das Anti-Piraterie-Abkommen ACTA
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Herweg, Sarah
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Im Juli des letzten Jahres lehnte das Europäische Parlament die Ratifizierung des Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in Folge von europaweiten Protesten gegen die im Abkommen enthaltenen Maßnahmen zum Schutz des Urheberrechts im Internet ab. Zu Beginn des vergangenen Jahres war das durch die Europäische Kommission und private Akteure vorangetriebene Abkommen in der Öffentlichkeit sowie bei vielen Politikern weitgehend unbekannt. Durch die Formierung einer lose zusammenhängenden Bewegung aus NGOs, Internetaktivisten und vor allem individuellen Internet-Nutzern wurde der internationale Vertrag binnen kurzer Zeit in der Öffentlichkeit thematisiert und politisiert. Der vorliegende Beitrag fragt nach der Rolle, die die Anti-ACTA-Bewegung für das Scheitern des Abkommens gespielt hat. Zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren und sozialen Bewegungen wird in der Literatur zu politischer Interessensvertretung im Gegensatz zu ressourcenstarken Akteuren nur wenig Durchsetzungsstärke in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen zugeschrieben. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird anhand einer Diskursnetzwerkanalyse die Konfiguration des Diskurses um ACTA veranschaulicht und gezeigt, dass sich die ACTA-Gegner als eine von zwei konkurrierenden Diskurskoalitionen durchsetzen konnten. Durch die Besetzung zentraler Frames dominierten sie den Diskurs und konnten einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die parlamentarischen Entscheidungsträger in Europa ausüben. Die Analyse erfolgt mit Hilfe der Computer-Software Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA), die es ermöglicht, Akteure und Konzepte zu verknüpfen und die Entwicklung des Diskurses dynamisch zu visualisieren.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Blessing or curse? The effects of transparency on the European Commission's success at the international ACTA negotiations</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68143</link>
      <description>Title: Blessing or curse? The effects of transparency on the European Commission's success at the international ACTA negotiations
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Eibauer, Josef
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The present study tries to investigate on the dynamics between the level of transparency of international treaty negotiations and the success of European Commission negotiators in achieving their particular political interests. Drawing upon an alternated version of Robert Putnam's two-level game approach, two distinct hypotheses are established. First, a low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations increases the amount of gains available to European Commission negotiators at the international level. Second, a low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations decreases the likelihood of ratification at the non-international level. These hypothesis are tested against the case of the international Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations and the subsequent ratification procedure that took place between the years 2005 and 2012. Empirically, it can be confirmed that the ACTA talks' low level of transparency detached the usually intertwined international, supranational, and domestic negotiation levels and thus increased the political leeway available to the Commission, leading to a treaty text that reflected its tough stance on intellectual property rights regulation. However, the low level of transparency also resulted in the Commission's lack of information about the true nature of negotiation outcomes that were acceptable to both the public and parliamentary majorities. Indeed, following a lively campaign against the treaty that was predominantly coordinated via the internet and social networks, ACTA ultimately failed ratification both on Member State and Community levels. In a nutshell: When the debated issues are controversial and salient to the public, the European Commission is likely to fail reaping the benefits of international negotiation secrecy.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2011 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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