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    <title>EconStor Collection: Public Policy Briefs, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54228</link>
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      <title>What should banks do? A Minskyan analysis</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54349</link>
      <description>Title: What should banks do? A Minskyan analysis
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Wray, L. Randall
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this new brief, Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray examines the later works of Hyman P. Minsky, with a focus on Minsky's general approach to financial institutions and policy. The New Deal reforms of the 1930s strengthened the financial system by separating investment banks from commercial banks and putting in place government guarantees such as deposit insurance. But the system's relative stability, and relatively high rate of economic growth, encouraged innovations that subverted those constraints over time. Financial wealth (and private debt) grew on trend, producing immense sums of money under professional management: we had entered what Minsky, in the early 1990s, labeled the money manager phase of capitalism. With help from the government, power was consolidated in a handful of huge firms that provided the four main financial services: commercial banking, payments services, investment banking, and mortgages. Brokers didn't have a fiduciary responsibility to act in their clients' best interests, while financial institutions bet against households, firms, and governments. By the early 2000s, says Wray, banking had strayed far from the (Minskyan) notion that it should promote the capital development of the economy.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2009 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>After the bust: The outlook for macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54348</link>
      <description>Title: After the bust: The outlook for macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Palley, Thomas I.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Change was the buzzword of the Obama campaign, in response to a political agenda precipitated by financial turmoil and a global economic crisis. According to Research Associate Thomas Palley, the neoliberal economic policy paradigm underlying that agenda must itself change if there is to be a successful policy response to the crisis. Mainstream economic theory remains unreformed, says Palley, and he warns of a return to failed policies if a deep crisis is averted. Since Post Keynesians accurately predicted that the US economy would implode from within, there is an opportunity for Post Keynesian economics to replace neoliberalism with a more successful approach. Palley notes that there is significant disagreement among economic paradigms about how to ensure full employment and shared prosperity. A salient feature of the neoliberal economy is the disconnect between wages and productivity growth. Workers are boxed in on all sides by globalization, labor market flexibility, inflation concerns, and a belief in small government that has eroded economic rights and government services. Financialization, the economic foundation of neoliberalism, serves the interests of financial markets and top management. Thus, reversing the neoliberal paradigm will require a policy agenda that addresses financialization and ensures that financial markets and firms are more closely aligned with the greater public interest.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Optimal CRA reform: Balancing government regulation and market forces</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54347</link>
      <description>Title: Optimal CRA reform: Balancing government regulation and market forces
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Thomas, Kenneth H.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: At issue in the debate over the renewal of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 are the various yardsticks regulators use to judge whether individual institutions are meeting the credit and service needs of low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities. Based on careful examination of new CRA data and assessments of comments by selected stakeholders, the author concludes that if the new rules are to succeed, regulators will have to strike a careful balance between various competing interests vying to tip the balance of power in their favor. For example, to offset the effects of a possibly too-close relationship between industry and government agencies, the rules could mandate very explicit and objective measures of institutions' lending performance. To relieve the burden of compliance, the rules could be simplified and pared down to their essentials. And to prevent banks from taking advantage of vulnerable members of LMI communities, rule makers could adopt strong measures against redatory lending.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2001 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Physician incentives in managed care organizations: Medical practice norms and the quality of care</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54346</link>
      <description>Title: Physician incentives in managed care organizations: Medical practice norms and the quality of care
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Cooper, David J.; Rebitzer, James B.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This brief considers the interaction between physician incentive systems and product market competition in the delivery of medical services via managed care organizations. At the center of the analysis is the process by which health maintenance organizations (HMOs) assemble physician networks and the role these networks play in the competition for customers. The authors find that although physician practice styles respond to financial incentives, there is little evidence that HMO cost-containment incentives cause a discernable reduction in care quality. They propose a model of the managed care marketplace that solves for both physician incentive contracts and HMO product market strategies in an environment of extreme information asymmetry: physicians perceive the quality of care they offer perfectly and their patients do not perceive it at all.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2001 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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