<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Community: arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53</link>
    <description>arqus - Working Group in Quantitative Tax Research</description>
    
    <textInput>
      <title>The Community's search engine</title>
      <description>Search the Channel</description>
      <name>search</name>
      <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
    </textInput>
    <item>
      <title>Tax attractiveness and the location of German-controlled subsidiaries</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72144</link>
      <description>Title: Tax attractiveness and the location of German-controlled subsidiaries
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Keller, Sara; Schanz, Deborah
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes whether taxation has an influence on the location decisions of multinational enterprises. As a tax measure, we employ the Tax Attractiveness Index (see Keller and Schanz 2013). This index covers 18 different tax factors, such as the taxation of dividends and capital gains, withholding taxes, the existence of a group taxation regime, and thin capitalization rules. Our count data regression analysis is based on a novel hand-collected data set consisting of the subsidiaries of German DAX30 companies. Controlling for non-tax effects, we find that a country's tax environment as measured by the Tax Attractiveness Index has a significantly positive effect on the number of Germancontrolled subsidiaries located there. Hence, our study implies that location decisions depend on a bundle of tax factors as captured by the index. In a second step, we show that the location decisions of German DAX30 companies cannot be explained by the statutory tax rate alone. In contrast, withholding taxes, double treaty networks, and special holding regimes seem to play a decisive role in location decisions. Previous studies examining only the influence of statutory tax rates may thus have underestimated the effects of taxation on the activities of multinational companies.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tax attractiveness and the location of German-controlled subsidiaries</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72144</link>
      <description>Title: Tax attractiveness and the location of German-controlled subsidiaries
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Keller, Sara; Schanz, Deborah
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes whether taxation has an influence on the location decisions of multinational enterprises. As a tax measure, we employ the Tax Attractiveness Index (see Keller and Schanz 2013). This index covers 18 different tax factors, such as the taxation of dividends and capital gains, withholding taxes, the existence of a group taxation regime, and thin capitalization rules. Our count data regression analysis is based on a novel hand-collected data set consisting of the subsidiaries of German DAX30 companies. Controlling for non-tax effects, we find that a country's tax environment as measured by the Tax Attractiveness Index has a significantly positive effect on the number of Germancontrolled subsidiaries located there. Hence, our study implies that location decisions depend on a bundle of tax factors as captured by the index. In a second step, we show that the location decisions of German DAX30 companies cannot be explained by the statutory tax rate alone. In contrast, withholding taxes, double treaty networks, and special holding regimes seem to play a decisive role in location decisions. Previous studies examining only the influence of statutory tax rates may thus have underestimated the effects of taxation on the activities of multinational companies.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The impact of corporate taxes and flexibility on entrepreneurial decisions with moral hazard and simultaneous firm and personal level taxation</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68469</link>
      <description>Title: The impact of corporate taxes and flexibility on entrepreneurial decisions with moral hazard and simultaneous firm and personal level taxation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Meißner, Fabian; Schneider, Georg; Sureth, Caren
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we investigate the incentive effects of corporate taxes in an agency setting with a principal facing an investment opportunity including an abandonment option. We are particularly interested in the interplay of taxation and the real option on the principal's incentives to motivate the agent to work hard. First, we extend the well-known studies on tax effects on decision making under uncertainty to moral hazard settings. In a benchmark case we find that, as confirmed in current literature, the corporate income tax has no incentive effect. If the principal accounts for the real option we show that paradoxical tax effects may occur. Also, with respect to the effect of the real option on the incentive problem we show that the option makes it less attractive for the principal to induce the agent to exert a high effort.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The impact of corporate taxes and flexibility on entrepreneurial decisions with moral hazard and simultaneous firm and personal level taxation</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68469</link>
      <description>Title: The impact of corporate taxes and flexibility on entrepreneurial decisions with moral hazard and simultaneous firm and personal level taxation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Meißner, Fabian; Schneider, Georg; Sureth, Caren
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we investigate the incentive effects of corporate taxes in an agency setting with a principal facing an investment opportunity including an abandonment option. We are particularly interested in the interplay of taxation and the real option on the principal's incentives to motivate the agent to work hard. First, we extend the well-known studies on tax effects on decision making under uncertainty to moral hazard settings. In a benchmark case we find that, as confirmed in current literature, the corporate income tax has no incentive effect. If the principal accounts for the real option we show that paradoxical tax effects may occur. Also, with respect to the effect of the real option on the incentive problem we show that the option makes it less attractive for the principal to induce the agent to exert a high effort.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

