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    <title>EconStor Collection: Discussion Papers, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung, WZB</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50912</link>
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      <title>Measuring local government technical (in)efficiency: An application and comparison of FDH, DEA and econometric approaches</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54663</link>
      <description>Title: Measuring local government technical (in)efficiency: An application and comparison of FDH, DEA and econometric approaches
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Geys, Benny; Moesen, Wim
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Economic efficiency – understood in terms of jurisdictions providing a maximum amount of output for a given level of inputs – is one potential means to evaluate public policies. Various approaches, however, co-exist to measure the (technical) efficiency of organizations. Given that these rely on different underlying assumptions, it is important to assess whether, and to what extent, the approach taken affects the outcome of efficiency studies. The present paper employs a dataset of local governments in Flanders in 2000 to compare the three common approaches to measure (in)efficiency (i.c. FDH, DEA and econometric techniques). Our results indicate that the methodological choices of instrumentation have a substantial effect on analytic performance measurement. Hence, assessing the robustness of the results across various approaches to efficiency measurement is crucial to avoid incorrect inferences.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Entry and experimentation in oligopolistic markets for experience goods</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51158</link>
      <description>Title: Entry and experimentation in oligopolistic markets for experience goods
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Krähmer, Daniel
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We investigate a two-period Bertrand market in which one seller introduces a new product of uncertain quality. The new product competes with an alternative good of known quality. Ex ante neither sellers nor consumers know the value of the new product. While consumers can learn their valuation by actual consumption (experimentation), sellers cannot observe experimentation outcomes. Thus, asymmetric information arises if the buyer experiments. As a result, the equilibrium is inefficient, and too little entry occurs.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2001 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Looking across borders: a test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51157</link>
      <description>Title: Looking across borders: a test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Geys, Benny
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of scholarly attention recently. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies is incomplete. In fact, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive – thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policy (in relation to that of neighbouring jurisdictions) rather than concentrating on spending (or taxation) levels alone. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Using Flemish local governments’ efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate tax revenues to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of such neighbourhood effects in local government policies.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Repeated contests with asymmetric information</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51156</link>
      <description>Title: Repeated contests with asymmetric information
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Münster, Johannes
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to one's type and can therefore influence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if effort is observable, this can induce a ratchet effect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little effort in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that they are of little ability. The effect reduces overall effort and increases equilibrium utility of the contestants when compared with two unrelated one-shot contests. It does, however, also introduce an allocative inefficiency since sometimes a contestant with a low valuation wins. The model assumes an imperfectly discriminating contest. In extension I show that, qualitatively, results are similar in a perfectly discriminating contest (all pay auction).</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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