<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Community: Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), The University of Nottingham</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49650</link>
    <description>The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)</description>
    <textInput>
      <title>The Community's search engine</title>
      <description>Search the Channel</description>
      <name>search</name>
      <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
    </textInput>
    <item>
      <title>Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: Empirical evidence from experimental duopolies</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67981</link>
      <description>Title: Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: Empirical evidence from experimental duopolies
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Determinants of revolt: Evidence from survey and laboratory data</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67980</link>
      <description>Title: Determinants of revolt: Evidence from survey and laboratory data
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Abbink, Klaus; Pezzini, Silvia
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper examines determinants of revolutionary behaviour. We study the role of freedom of communication, repression of opposition and the government's selfishness. Combining econometric analysis of survey data with a laboratory experiment, we analyse how these factors affect preferences for revolt and revolutionary action. We introduce an experimental game capturing essential features of a dictatorship. The results show that the feeling that the government operates selfishly increases both revolutionary preferences and actions. Political repression and lack of communication freedom increase revolutionary attitudes but decrease actual opposition, consistent with the collective action problem faced by opposition to a dictatorship.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Testing for feedback-conditional regret effects using a natural lottery</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67979</link>
      <description>Title: Testing for feedback-conditional regret effects using a natural lottery
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Humphrey, Steven J.; Mann, Paul; Starmer, Chris
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We report the results of an experimental test for feedback-conditional regret effects using a naturally occurring gamble. The properties of this gamble are likely to engage decision-makers to a greater extent than conventional abstract laboratory gambles, and be more generally exhibited by real world objects of choice. We argue that this conveys a higher than typical degree of external validity on our findings. We observe that feedback on the outcome of foregone choices enhances the salience of regret as a decision motive.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Choice under uncertainty in developing countries</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67978</link>
      <description>Title: Choice under uncertainty in developing countries
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Harrison, Glenn W.; Humphrey, Steven J.; Verschoor, Arjan
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Using these data we estimate that just over 50% of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory. Our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately. However, when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously, we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behavior for subjects behaving according to prospect theory. We conclude that the current practice of designing policies under the assumption that one or other explains all behavior is fundamentally flawed.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

