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    <title>EconStor Collection: Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des GIGA</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48638</link>
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      <title>The effects of regime cooptation on the geographical distribution of violence: Evidence from the Syrian civil war</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73668</link>
      <description>Titel: The effects of regime cooptation on the geographical distribution of violence: Evidence from the Syrian civil war
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: De Juan, Alexander; Bank, André
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Is violent opposition less likely to occur in subnational regions that have been treated preferentially by the respective country's ruling elite? Many authoritarian regimes try to secure political support by providing critical segments of the population with privileged access to economic or political rents. This study is interested in the effects of this strategy. Our empirical analysis is based on crowdsourcing data on the number and geospatial distribution of fatalities in the Syrian civil war. We also use satellite images of the earth at night to measure spatial variations in access to electricity across Syrian subdistricts; these data are complemented with information from the last Syrian population census. Estimations of fixed-effects logit models confirm the hypothesis that the risk of violence has been lower in subdistricts that had been favored by the ruling regime in terms of preferential access to electricity in times of power shortages.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
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      <title>Power sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's experience</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73667</link>
      <description>Titel: Power sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's experience
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Rosiny, Stephan
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: In the last two years, the Syrian uprising has turned from a civil protest movement against an authoritarian regime into an outright civil war in which the antagonists affiliations' and identities are increasingly framed in sectarian speech. In summer 2012, various politicians and analysts suggested a power-sharing agreement between regime and opposition representatives as a solution to break the vicious circle of escalating violence. They called it a Syrian Taifh after the 1989 peace accord that ended Lebanon's long-lasting civil war (1975-1990) by dividing power among religious communities. Others rejected the idea of a consociational power-sharing deal outright because they hold it responsible for the continued sectarian pillarization of Lebanese society. Moreover, Syria's experience is said to differ significantly from Lebanon's, making the effective transmittal of the Lebanese model impossible. This paper takes these differing arguments into consideration and investigates whether power sharing could help to deescalate the Syrian conflict and what lessons should be taken from Lebanon's experience. Lebanon shows that consociationalism tends to stabilize - even deepen - social cleavages. Therefore, a Syrian Taif should gradually substitute fixed guarantees of shares of power with centripetal and unitary state institutions. Furthermore, in addition to internal actors, external powers have to be convinced that power sharing may be the only viable option for ending the devastating civil war in Syria and for preventing the further spread of violence into neighboring countries.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Power sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's experience</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73667</link>
      <description>Titel: Power sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's experience
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Rosiny, Stephan
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: In the last two years, the Syrian uprising has turned from a civil protest movement against an authoritarian regime into an outright civil war in which the antagonists affiliations' and identities are increasingly framed in sectarian speech. In summer 2012, various politicians and analysts suggested a power-sharing agreement between regime and opposition representatives as a solution to break the vicious circle of escalating violence. They called it a Syrian Taifh after the 1989 peace accord that ended Lebanon's long-lasting civil war (1975-1990) by dividing power among religious communities. Others rejected the idea of a consociational power-sharing deal outright because they hold it responsible for the continued sectarian pillarization of Lebanese society. Moreover, Syria's experience is said to differ significantly from Lebanon's, making the effective transmittal of the Lebanese model impossible. This paper takes these differing arguments into consideration and investigates whether power sharing could help to deescalate the Syrian conflict and what lessons should be taken from Lebanon's experience. Lebanon shows that consociationalism tends to stabilize - even deepen - social cleavages. Therefore, a Syrian Taif should gradually substitute fixed guarantees of shares of power with centripetal and unitary state institutions. Furthermore, in addition to internal actors, external powers have to be convinced that power sharing may be the only viable option for ending the devastating civil war in Syria and for preventing the further spread of violence into neighboring countries.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The effects of regime cooptation on the geographical distribution of violence: Evidence from the Syrian civil war</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73668</link>
      <description>Titel: The effects of regime cooptation on the geographical distribution of violence: Evidence from the Syrian civil war
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: De Juan, Alexander; Bank, André
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Is violent opposition less likely to occur in subnational regions that have been treated preferentially by the respective country's ruling elite? Many authoritarian regimes try to secure political support by providing critical segments of the population with privileged access to economic or political rents. This study is interested in the effects of this strategy. Our empirical analysis is based on crowdsourcing data on the number and geospatial distribution of fatalities in the Syrian civil war. We also use satellite images of the earth at night to measure spatial variations in access to electricity across Syrian subdistricts; these data are complemented with information from the last Syrian population census. Estimations of fixed-effects logit models confirm the hypothesis that the risk of violence has been lower in subdistricts that had been favored by the ruling regime in terms of preferential access to electricity in times of power shortages.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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