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    <title>EconStor Collection: Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47266</link>
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      <title>The Norwegian market for pharmaceuticals and the non-mandatory substitution reform of 2001: The case of enalapril</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63229</link>
      <description>Title: The Norwegian market for pharmaceuticals and the non-mandatory substitution reform of 2001: The case of enalapril
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Razzolini, Tiziano
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: A new demand model which accounts for the effect of the age of drugs on pharmaceutical demand is provided. Within this framework the problem of persistence in consumption of original branded drugs and a particular case of intra-molecular substitution are analyzed. I find that interacting price with time in a logit demand structure provides intuitive patterns of substitution between branded and generic drugs and yields, with an assumption of Bertrand-Nashequilibrium on the supply side, intuitive dynamics of the mark-ups for generic manufacturers over time. The effect of a non-mandatory substitution reform introduced in Norway in March 2001 is analyzed in terms of increased sensitivity to price and is found to be negligible. The presence of competition between generic producers is also verified.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2003 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Innovating firms and aggregate innovation</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63228</link>
      <description>Title: Innovating firms and aggregate innovation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Klette, Tor Jakob; Kortum, Samuel
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We develop a parsimonious model of innovating firms rich enough to confront firm-level evidence. It captures the dynamic behavior of individual heterogeneous firms, describes the evolution of an industry with simultaneous entry and exit, and delivers a general equilibrium model of technological change. While unifying the theoretical analysis of firms, industries, and the aggregate economy, the models yields insight into empirical work on innovating firms. It accounts for the persistence over time of firms’ R &amp; D investments, the concentration of R &amp; D among incumbents firms, and the link between R &amp; D and patenting . Furthermore, it explains why R &amp; D as a fraction of revenues is strongly related to firm productivity yet largely unrelated to firm size or growth.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2001 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Downward nominal wage rigidity in the OECD</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63227</link>
      <description>Title: Downward nominal wage rigidity in the OECD
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Holden, Steinar; Wulfsberg, Fredrik
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper explores the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in 19 OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for hourly nominal wages at industry level. Based on a novel nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country and year specific variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we reject the hypothesis of no DNWR. The fraction of wage cuts prevented due to DNWR has fallen over time, from 70 percent in the 1970s to 11 percent in the late 1990s, but the number of industries affected by DNWR has increased. DNWR is more prevalent when inflation is high,unemployment is low, union density is high and employment protection legislation is strict.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Does the logic of collective action explain the logic of corporatism?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63226</link>
      <description>Title: Does the logic of collective action explain the logic of corporatism?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Wallerstein, Michael; Moene, Karl Ove
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action has provided the dominant framework for understanding the impact of encompassing unions and employers confederations on wage-setting in Western Europe. In particular, scholars have drawn upon Olson's writing to descripe corporatism as a means for attaining the collective goods of low unemployment and low inflation in highly unionized labor markets. The strongest impact of corporatist institutions in the labor market, however, was to generate greater wage equality rather than superior macroeconomic performance. To understand the most important impact of corporatist institutions, a new framework that emphasizes the effect of wage-setting institutions on the distribution of wages and salaries is needed. In this paper, we present one component of such a framework with a model that illustrates how both employers and unions might gain by central agreements that reduce wage inequality relative to the equilibrium wage distribution with decentralized wage-setting.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2002 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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