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    <title>EconStor Collection: Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43754</link>
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      <title>Pollution perception: An inquiry into intergenerational equity</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43840</link>
      <description>Title: Pollution perception: An inquiry into intergenerational equity
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Schumacher, Ingmar; Zou, Benteng
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations with a pollution sector by allowing generations to have a certain pollution perception with regards to the stock of pollution. Pollution perception, assumed to be part of the generations' preferences, can be either a concern for the flow of pollution only, or for the stock, or anything in between. We analyse the different steady states for their implications on intergenerational equity. Our main result is that if generations are only partly concerned with the actual stock of pollution, then periodic cycling will occur. We use the concept of Intergenerational Moral Intuition to analyse this periodic cycling. Our main policy conclusion is that decision makers who would like to achieve intergenerational equitable outcomes must either use the maximin criterion or take decisions spanning several generations in order to avoid the period cycling effect.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Brain drain, remittances, and fertility</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43839</link>
      <description>Title: Brain drain, remittances, and fertility
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Marchiori, Luca; Pieretti, Patrice; Zou, Benteng
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of skilled migration and remittances on fertility decisions at origin. We develop an overlapping generations model which accounts for endogenous fertility and education. Parents choose the number of children they want to raise and decide upon how many children obtain higher education. Only high skilled individuals migrate with a certain probability and remit to their parents. We find that an increase in the probability to emigrate leads both high and low skilled parents to send more children to obtain higher education. However the effect on the number of children is ambiguous. In a further analysis, we calibrate the model to match different characteristics of a developing economy. When the destination country relaxes the immigration restrictions, more high skilled individuals leave the origin country. The result is that, at origin, increased high skilled emigration reduces fertility and fosters human capital accumulation.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43838</link>
      <description>Title: On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dimitrov, Dinko
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Optimal stopping under ambiguity</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43837</link>
      <description>Title: Optimal stopping under ambiguity
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Riedel, Frank
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We consider optimal stopping problems for ambiguity averse decision makers with multiple priors. In general, backward induction fails. If, however, the class of priors is time-consistent, we establish a generalization of the classical theory of optimal stopping. To this end, we develop first steps of a martingale theory for multiple priors. We define minimax (super)martingales, provide a Doob-Meyer decomposition, and characterize minimax martingales. This allows us to extend the standard backward induction procedure to ambiguous, time-consistent preferences. The value function is the smallest process that is a minimax supermartingale and dominates the payoff process. It is optimal to stop when the current payoff is equal to the value function. Moving on, we study the infinite horizon case. We show that the value process satisfies the same backward recursion (Bellman equation) as in the finite horizon case. The finite horizon solutions converge to the infinite horizon solution. Finally, we characterize completely the set of time-consistent multiple priors in the binomial tree. We solve two classes of examples: the so-called independent and indistinguishable case (the parking problem) and the case of American Options (Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model).</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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