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    <title>EconStor Community: Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf</title>
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      <title>Status concerns as a motive for crime?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73189</link>
      <description>Title: Status concerns as a motive for crime?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a higher detection probability and higher sanctions. In addition, we argue that the socially optimal level of the detection probability and the sanction will often be higher when potential offenders care about their relative positions. Our analysis can be linked to one of the most important criminological theories of crime, namely strain theory.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Status concerns as a motive for crime?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73189</link>
      <description>Title: Status concerns as a motive for crime?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a higher detection probability and higher sanctions. In addition, we argue that the socially optimal level of the detection probability and the sanction will often be higher when potential offenders care about their relative positions. Our analysis can be linked to one of the most important criminological theories of crime, namely strain theory.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Adverse effects of patent pooling on product development and commercialization</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72576</link>
      <description>Title: Adverse effects of patent pooling on product development and commercialization
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Zhang, Nanyun
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The conventional wisdom is that the formation of patent pools is welfare enhancing when patents are complementary, since the pool avoids a double-marginalization problem associated with independent licensing. This conventional wisdom relies on the effects that pooling has on downstream prices. However, it does not account for the potentially significant role of the effect of pooling on downstream innovation. The focus of this paper is on downstream product development and commercialization on the basis of perfectly complementary patents. We consider development technologies that entail spillovers between rivals, and assume that final demand products are imperfect substitutes. When pool formation facilitates information sharing and either increases spillovers in development or decreases the degree of product differentiation, patent pools can adversely affect welfare by reducing the incentives towards product development and product market competition ven with perfectly complementary patents. The analysis modifies and even negates the conventional wisdom for some settings and suggests why patent pools are uncommon in science-based industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals that are characterized by tacit knowledge and incomplete patents.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Adverse effects of patent pooling on product development and commercialization</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72576</link>
      <description>Title: Adverse effects of patent pooling on product development and commercialization
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Zhang, Nanyun
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The conventional wisdom is that the formation of patent pools is welfare enhancing when patents are complementary, since the pool avoids a double-marginalization problem associated with independent licensing. This conventional wisdom relies on the effects that pooling has on downstream prices. However, it does not account for the potentially significant role of the effect of pooling on downstream innovation. The focus of this paper is on downstream product development and commercialization on the basis of perfectly complementary patents. We consider development technologies that entail spillovers between rivals, and assume that final demand products are imperfect substitutes. When pool formation facilitates information sharing and either increases spillovers in development or decreases the degree of product differentiation, patent pools can adversely affect welfare by reducing the incentives towards product development and product market competition ven with perfectly complementary patents. The analysis modifies and even negates the conventional wisdom for some settings and suggests why patent pools are uncommon in science-based industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals that are characterized by tacit knowledge and incomplete patents.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2012 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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