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    <title>EconStor Community: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40</link>
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      <title>Climbing the job ladder: New evidence of gender inequity</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55138</link>
      <description>Titel: Climbing the job ladder: New evidence of gender inequity
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Johnston, David W.; Lee, Wang-Sheng
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: An explanation for the gender wage gap is that women are less able or less willing to 'climb the job ladder.' However, the empirical evidence on gender differences in job mobility has been mixed. Focusing on a subsample of younger, university-educated workers from an Australian longitudinal survey, we find strong evidence that the dynamics of promotions and employer changes worsen women's labour market position.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Firm heterogeneity, informal wage and good governance</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55137</link>
      <description>Titel: Firm heterogeneity, informal wage and good governance
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Kar, Saibal; Marjit, Sugata
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to formal sector in dual labor markets. We use a framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and politically dictated enforcement strategies. Firms which operate both in the formal and informal sectors do very little to increase employment when faced with the opportunity of hiring workers in the informal labor market. Thus enforcement of labor laws and other regulations should not have aggregate employment effects, particularly when workers are productively homogeneous. For firms operating exclusively in the informal sector, the outcome is different. Such features determine the stringency of enforcement in a market characterized by firms with varying levels of productivity. For example, in case of firms with relatively high levels of productivity, enforcement has to be stricter than in the case with relatively low productivity firms. Taxing the more productive seems to be the optimal strategy.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>The use of violence in illegal markets: Evidence from mahogany trade in the Brazilian Amazon</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55136</link>
      <description>Titel: The use of violence in illegal markets: Evidence from mahogany trade in the Brazilian Amazon
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Chimeli, Ariaster B.; Soares, Rodrigo R.
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Agents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to guarantee property rights, to enforce contracts, or to seek protection from competitors' improper behaviors. In these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to fight for market share. This relationship plays a major role in the debate on the pernicious effects of the illegality of drug trade. This paper explores a singular episode of transition of a market from legal to illegal to provide a first piece of evidence on the causal effect of illegality on systemic violence. Brazil has historically been the main world producer of big leaf mahogany (a tropical wood). Starting in the 1990s, policies restricting extraction and trade of mahogany, culminating with prohibition, were implemented. First, we present evidence that large scale mahogany trade persisted after prohibition, through misclassification of mahogany exports as other tropical timber species. Second, we document relative increases in violence after prohibition in areas with: (i) higher share of mahogany exports before prohibition; (ii) higher suspected illegal mahogany activity after prohibition; and (iii) natural occurrence of mahogany. We believe this is one of the first documented experiences of increase in violence following the transition of a market from legal to illegal.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>A general model of technical change with an application to the OECD countries</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55135</link>
      <description>Titel: A general model of technical change with an application to the OECD countries
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Heshmati, Almas; Kumbhakar, Subal C.
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: In the neoclassical production functions model technical change (TC) is assumed to be exogenous and it is specified as a function of time. However, some exogenous external factors other than time can also affect the rate of TC. In this paper we model TC via a combination of time trend (purely non-economic) and other observable exogenous factors, which we call technology shifters (economic factors). We use several composite technology indices based on appropriate combinations of the external economic factors which are indicators of different aspects of technology. These technology indices are embedded into the production function in such a way that they can complement to different inputs. By estimating the generalized production function, we get estimates of TC which is decomposed TC into a pure time component as well as several producer specific external economic factors. Furthermore, the technology shifters allow for non-neutral and biased shifts in TC. We also consider a simple model in which the technology shifters are aggregated into one single index. The empirical model uses panel data on OECD, accession and enhanced engagement countries observed during 1980-2006.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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