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    <title>EconStor Collection: CSIO Electronic Working Papers, Northwestern University</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/279</link>
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      <title>Contracting and enforcement with a self-regulatory organization</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38711</link>
      <description>Title: Contracting and enforcement with a self-regulatory organization
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: DeMarzo, Peter M.; Fishman, Michael J.; Hagerty, Kathleen M.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 1999 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Storable good monopoly: The role of commitment</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38710</link>
      <description>Title: Storable good monopoly: The role of commitment
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dudine, Paolo; Hendel, Igal; Lizzeri, Alessandro
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time. The literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive. The key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling. In the case of storable goods the stockpiling motive has been documented in recent empirical literature. Advance purchases can also arise in the case of durables, although the literature has not focused on this case. We show that if the monopolist cannot commit, then prices are higher in all periods, and social welfare is lower, than in the case in which the monopolist can commit. This is in contrast with the analysis in the literature on the Coase conjecture.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2003 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An empirical perspective on auctions</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38709</link>
      <description>Title: An empirical perspective on auctions
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hendricks, Ken; Porter, Robert H.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of outstanding issues. We describe some basic concepts, to highlight some strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and so indicate where further research may be warranted. We discuss identification and estimation issues, with an emphasis on the connection between theory and empirical practice. We also discuss both structural and reduced form empirical approaches.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dynamic merger review</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38708</link>
      <description>Title: Dynamic merger review
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Nocke, Volker; Whinston, Michael D.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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