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    <title>EconStor Collection: Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/265</link>
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      <title>The great recession and bank lending to small businesses</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55663</link>
      <description>Title: The great recession and bank lending to small businesses
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Montoriol-Garriga, Judit; Wang, J. Christina
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper investigates whether small firms have experienced worse tightening of credit conditions during the Great Recession than large firms. To structure the empirical analysis, the paper first develops a simple model of bank loan pricing that derives both the interest rates on loans actually made and the marginal condition for loans that would be rationed in the event of an economic downturn. Empirical estimations using loan-level data find evidence that, once we account for the contractual features of business loans made under formal commitments to lend, interest rate spreads on small loans have declined on average relative to spreads on large loans during the Great Recession. Quantile regressions further reveal that the relative decline in average spread is entirely accounted for by loans to the riskier borrowers. These findings are consistent with the pattern of differentially more rationing of credit to small borrowers in recessions as predicted by the model. This suggests that policy measures that counter this effect by encouraging lending to small businesses may be effective in stimulating their recovery and, in turn, job growth.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Wage setting patterns and monetary policy: International evidence</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55662</link>
      <description>Title: Wage setting patterns and monetary policy: International evidence
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Olivei, Giovanni; Tenreyro, Silvana
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Systematic differences in the timing of wage setting decisions among industrialized countries provide an ideal framework to study the importance of wage rigidity in the transmission of monetary policy. The Japanese Shunto presents the best-known case of bunching in wage setting decisions: From February to May, most firms set wages that remain in place until the following year; wage rigidity, thus, is relatively higher immediately after the Shunto. Similarly, in the United States, a large fraction of firms adjust wages in the last quarter of the calendar year. In contrast, wage agreements in Germany are well spread within the year, implying a relatively uniform degree of rigidity. We exploit variation in the timing of wage setting decisions within the year in Japan, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France to investigate the effects of monetary policy under different degrees of effective wage rigidity. Our findings lend support to the long-held, though scarcely tested, view that wage rigidity plays a key role in the transmission of monetary policy.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2009 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>The value of risk: Measuring the service output of U.S. commercial banks</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55661</link>
      <description>Title: The value of risk: Measuring the service output of U.S. commercial banks
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Basu, Susanto; Inklaar, Robert; Wang, J. Christina
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Rather than charging direct fees, banks often charge implicitly for their services via interest spreads. As a result, much of bank output has to be estimated indirectly. In contrast to current statistical practice, dynamic optimizing models of banks argue that compensation for bearing systematic risk is not part of bank output. We apply these models and find that between 1997 and 2007, in the U.S. National Accounts, on average, bank output is overestimated by 21 percent and GDP is overestimated by 0.3 percent. Moreover, compared with current methods, our new estimates imply more plausible estimates of the share of capital in income and the return on fixed capital.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>The responsiveness of married women's labor force participation to income and wages: Recent changes and possible explanations</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55660</link>
      <description>Title: The responsiveness of married women's labor force participation to income and wages: Recent changes and possible explanations
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bradbury, Katharine; Katz, Jane
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: One contributor to the twentieth century rise in married women's labor force participation was declining responsiveness to husbands' wages and other family income. Now that the rapid rise in married women's participation has slowed and even begun to reverse, this paper asks whether married women's cross-wage elasticities have continued to fall. Using the outgoing rotation group of the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and estimating coefficients separately for each year from 1994 through 2006, we find that the decline in responsiveness to husbands' wages has come to an endat least for the time beingand even find evidence of rising responsiveness to husbands' wages. This increase in the cross-wage elasticity of participation occurs largely between 1997 and 2002 and is concentrated among younger women and women with children. We also explore a number of possible explanations for this development. We conclude that declining divorce rates, rising child care costs, and the increasing prevalence of high work hours for high payall of which were more pronounced at the high end of the income distributionalong with rising income inequality may have played a role. Also possible is that some of the decline is an artifact of changes in the tax system and the way income is measured. In addition, we observe some backsliding in attitudes supportive of gender equality in the market and at home, and perhaps a change in lifecycle timing among Generation X women.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2007 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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