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    <title>EconStor Community: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Rostock</title>
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      <title>Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39784</link>
      <description>Title: Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Kuhn, Michael; Gundlach, Erich 13167837X
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We consider resource allocation within an organisation and show how delegation bears on moral hazard and adverse selection when agents have a preference for autonomy. Agents may care about autonomy for reasons of job-satisfaction, status or greater reputation when performing well under autonomy. Separating allocations (overall budget and degree of delegation) are characterised depending on the preference for autonomy. As the latter increases, the degree of delegation assigned to productive and unproductive agents converges. If agents' preferences for monetary rewards are weak, the principal will not employ financial transfers. Pooling then arises under a strong preference for autonomy.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Green R&amp;D versus end-of-pipe emission abatement: A model of directed technical change</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39785</link>
      <description>Title: Green R&amp;D versus end-of-pipe emission abatement: A model of directed technical change
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Rauscher, Michael
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The paper looks at a model of directed technical change in an environmental-economics context. Firms can do conventional or 'green' R&amp;D or they can abate emissions at the end of pipe. The paper has two main foci. On the one hand, it investigates the impact of environmental regulation on the allocation of resources to conventional R&amp;D, green R&amp;D, and end-of-pipe abatement. On the other hand, it addresses the question whether stricter emission standards should be used to support green R&amp;D and/or economic growth.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>The quality of insurance intermediary services: An analysis of conduct and performance in the German market of insurance intermediation</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39783</link>
      <description>Title: The quality of insurance intermediary services: An analysis of conduct and performance in the German market of insurance intermediation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Eckardt, Martina
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Based on a sample of 946 German insurance intermediaries, the factors that affect the quality of the information services provided by them are studied using OLS-estimations. Applying a search theoretical approach, we analyze the impact of supply and demand side variables on service quality. Besides, the working of signaling devices (like reputation, advertising or certificates) to reduce asymmetric information with respect to the service quality of insurance intermediaries is examined. The results obtained support the main hypotheses derived from industrial organization theories as to the poor working of quality competition under incomplete and asymmetric information on the side of consumers. Thus, public policy should concentrate on increasing transparency about intermediaries' (in-)dependence from insurance companies and improve consumers' financial literacy to raise the overall quality of the information services provided by insurance intermediaries.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Biodiversity and geography</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39782</link>
      <description>Title: Biodiversity and geography
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Rauscher, Michael; Barbier, Edward B.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The paper combines an economic-geography model of agglomeration and periphery with a model of species diversity and looks at optimal policies of biodiversity conservation. The subject of the paper is 'natural' biodiversity, which is inevitably impaired by anthropogenic impact. Thus, the economic and the ecological system compete for space and the question arises as to how this conflict should be resolved. The decisive parameters of the model are related to biological diversity (endemism vs. redundancy of species) and the patterns of economic geography (centrifugal and centripetal forces). As regards the choice of environmental-policy instruments, it is shown that Pigouvian taxes do not always establish the optimal allocation.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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