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    <title>EconStor Community: ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18</link>
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      <title>The Greek crisis: Causes and consequences</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54934</link>
      <description>Titel: The Greek crisis: Causes and consequences
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Garcia Pascual, Antonio I.; Ghezzi, Piero
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Greece has reached a point where, under any plausible macroeconomic scenario, public debt will continue growing faster than GDP. Fiscal consolidation alone cannot close the solvency gap. A substantial reduction in the stock of debt is needed. Even post-debt restructuring, there is no guarantee that the government will succeed in its dual goal of restoring fiscal solvency and closing the competitiveness gap. Yet we think Greece stands a better chance of accomplishing these goals from inside the EMU rather than outside it. This chapter takes stock of the factors that led to the explosion of public debt, the loss of competitiveness, and the failure of the first EU-IMF programme. We also present our views on the likely debt restructuring (and post-restructuring) scenarios.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Property rights, optimal public enforcement, and growth</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54933</link>
      <description>Titel: Property rights, optimal public enforcement, and growth
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Irmen, Andreas; Kuehnel, Johanna
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government may assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare an equilibrium path without property rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Political economy: Success or failure?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54932</link>
      <description>Titel: Political economy: Success or failure?
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Frey, Bruno S.
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Political Economy and Public Choice have studied the interactions between the economy and the polity for over 60 years now. The present paper endeavours to provide a critical discussion of this literature and its achievements. In particular, it starts with the different approaches based on empirically tested or politometric models, and it then proceeds to discuss different studies of the effects that particular rules of the game have on politico-economic outcomes. The third part will deal with studies that take institutions to be endogenous and aim at explaining why particular institutions emerge. Finally, the question whether political economy has been a success or a failure will be tackled. While the success in terms of the position gained in economic research and teaching is undeniable, a look at one of the most thriving recent areas of economics, namely happiness research, will reveal that fundamental lessons all too often remain disregarded.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Efficient coordination in weakest-link games</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54931</link>
      <description>Titel: Efficient coordination in weakest-link games
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&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin
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&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to choose their interaction neighborhood. We conduct experiments with medium sized and large groups and show that neighborhood choice indeed leads to coordination on the fully efficient equilibrium, irrespective of group size. This leads to substantial welfare effects. Achieved welfare is between 40 and 60 percent higher in games with neighborhood choice than without neighborhood choice. We identify exclusion as the simple but very effective mechanism underlying this result. In early rounds, high performers exclude low performers who in consequence learn to become high performers.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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