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    <title>EconStor Collection: Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179</link>
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      <title>An empirical analysis of UK imports: Is there evidence of hysteresis?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39445</link>
      <description>Title: An empirical analysis of UK imports: Is there evidence of hysteresis?
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Penkova, Emilia
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The paper re-examines the validity of the hysteresis hypothesis by applying it to the UK import volume from the world's five largest economies: Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the USA, over the period 1975 to 1994. Disaggregated bilateral data (4-digit ISIC) are used and hysteresis is captured by dummy variable which is an extension of work by Parsley and Wei (1993). Panel estimation is undertaken and the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique is employed. There is evidence that hysteresis appears important for UK imports and varies across industries and countries.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>On the dynamics of interstate migration: Migration costs and self-selection</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39444</link>
      <description>Title: On the dynamics of interstate migration: Migration costs and self-selection
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bayer, Christian; Juessen, Falko
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper develops a tractable dynamic microeconomic model of migration decisions that is aggregated to describe the behavior of interregional migration. Our structural approach allows us to deal with dynamic self-selection problems that arise from the endogeneity of location choice and the persistency of migration incentives. Keeping track to the distribution of migration incentives over time has important consequences, because the dynamics of this distribution influences the estimation of structural parameters, such as migration costs. For US interstate migration, we obtain a cost estimate of somewhat less than one-half of an average annual household income. This is substantially less than the migration costs estimated by previous studies. We attribute this difference to the treatment of the dynamic self-selection problem.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2005 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Spatial agglomeration and product market competition</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39443</link>
      <description>Title: Spatial agglomeration and product market competition
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Alsleben, Christoph
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper tests the hypothesis that product market competition has a negative impact on spatial agglomeration. This hypothesis emerges as an interpetation of the models by Combes and Duranton (2001) and Alsleben (2005) which are about firms' location choice in the presence of knowledge spillovers. Using data for German manufacturing industries, the result is that, while controlling for other agglomeration forces, higher industrial concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index of concentration of sales, implies stronger spatial agglomeration, as measured by Ellison and Glaeser's (1997) index of concentration.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Evaluation frequency and forgetful principals</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39442</link>
      <description>Title: Evaluation frequency and forgetful principals
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&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Angerhausen, Julia
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&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the bahavior of a principal with bounded memory who can offer a two-period performance-based contract to an agent. In the model he can choose whether to evaluate the agent after each period or only at the end of the second period. If the agent is wealth-constrained, the option to evaluate him twice can be profitable. But without the constraint on the part of the agent, the principal will always prefer to evaluate only once in order to reduce evaluation costs. Finally we consider a modification leads us to a trade-off between more and less frequent evaluations.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2004 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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