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    <title>EconStor Collection: Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting, Universität Frankfurt a. M.</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120</link>
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      <title>Does IT standardization help to boost cost and profit efficiency? Empirical evidence from German savings banks</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39051</link>
      <description>Title: Does IT standardization help to boost cost and profit efficiency? Empirical evidence from German savings banks
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Noth, Felix; Slotty, Constantin; Hackethal, Andreas
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of IT standardization on bank performance based on a panel of 457 German savings banks over the period from 1996 to 2006. We measure IT standardization as the fraction of IT expenses for centralized services over banks' total IT expenses. Bank efficiency, in turn, is measured by traditional accounting performance indicators as well as by cost and profit efficiencies that are estimated by a stochastic frontier approach. Our results suggest that IT standardization is conducive to cost efficiency. The relation is positive and robust for small and medium-sized banks but vanishes for very large banks. Furthermore, our study confirms the often cited computer paradox by showing that total IT expenditures negatively impact cost efficiency and have no influence on bank profits. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is first to empirically explore whether IT standardization enhances efficiency by employing genuine data of banks' IT expenditures.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Manipulation des Börsenkurses durch gezielte Informationspolitik im Rahmen von Squeeze-Outs? Eine empirische Untersuchung am deutschen Kapitalmarkt</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39050</link>
      <description>Title: Manipulation des Börsenkurses durch gezielte Informationspolitik im Rahmen von Squeeze-Outs? Eine empirische Untersuchung am deutschen Kapitalmarkt
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Daske, Holger; Bassemir, Moritz; Fischer, Felix F.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob der Mehrheitsaktionär einer Gesellschaft im Vorfeld eines Zwangsausschlusses von Minderheitsaktionären (sog. Squeeze-Out) versucht, die Kapitalmarkterwartungen negativ zu beeinflussen. Ein solches 'manipulatives' Verhalten wird häufig in der juristischen wie betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur unterstellt, da der Aktienkurs für die Abfindungshöhe die Wertuntergrenze bildet. Unsere empirische Untersuchung der Bilanz- und Pressemitteilungspolitik von Squeeze-Out-Unternehmen im Vorfeld der Ankündigung einer solchen Maßnahme am deutschen Kapitalmarkt zeigt, dass in diesem Zeitraum tatsächlich ein signifikanter Anstieg (Rückgang) der im Ton pessimistischen (optimistischen) Pressemitteilungen feststellbar ist. Allerdings zeigt sich weiter, dass die Aktien der Squeeze-Out-Kandidaten bereits im Vorfeld und am Tag der Ankündigung so hohe positive Überrenditen erzielen, dass der von uns quantifizierte kumulierte Effekt der Informationspolitik auf die Börsenbewertung einen insgesamt nur sehr geringen Einfluss ausübt und von anderen Faktoren (z.B. Abfindungsspekulationen) dominiert wird.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Financial constraints and the decision to lease: Evidence from German SME</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39049</link>
      <description>Title: Financial constraints and the decision to lease: Evidence from German SME
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Slotty, Constantin
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that in particular financially constrained firms lease a higher share of their assets to mitigate problems of asymmetric information. The assumptions are tested under a GMM framework which simultaneously controls for endogeneity problems and firms' fixed effects. We find that the share of total annual lease expenses attributable to either finance or operating leases is considerably higher for financially strained as well as for small and fast-growing firms those likely to face higher agency-cost premiums on marginal financing. Furthermore, our results confirm the substitution of leasing and debt financing for lessee firms. However, we find no evidence that firms use leasing as an instrument to reduce their tax burdens.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Stale information, shocks and volatility</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39048</link>
      <description>Title: Stale information, shocks and volatility
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Gropp, Reint; Kadareja, Arjan
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information or beliefs on volatility. Using high-frequency intraday data, we estimate the volatility effect of a well identified shock on the volatility of the stock returns of large European banks as a function of the quality of available public information about the banks. We hypothesise that, as the publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence should increase, as the private information (beliefs) of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We argue that the results have implications for debate surrounding the opacity of banks and the transparency requirements that may be imposed on banks under Pillar III of the New Basel Accord.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Oct 2006 22:58:59 GMT</pubDate>
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