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    <title>EconStor</title>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30177">
    <title>Ansatzpunkte zur Veränderung sozialer Praktiken in Unternehmen durch Managementberater: Eine empirische Analyse</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30177</link>
    <description>Titel: Ansatzpunkte zur Veränderung sozialer Praktiken in Unternehmen durch Managementberater: Eine empirische Analyse
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Hellmann, Christoph
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Diese Arbeit untersucht mit Hilfe von vier Fallbeispielen, wie Managementberater Unternehmen verändern können. Den theoretischen Hintergrund der Arbeit bildet der Practice Turn in der Sozialtheorie bzw. der Strategy-As-Practice Ansatz in der Managementwissenschaft. Vor diesem werden sowohl Unternehmen als auch die Arbeit von Managementberatern theoretisch neu beschrieben. Es wird gezeigt, wie Managementberater ein aufgeklärt rationales Problem- und Lösungsverständnis entwickeln, um eine koordinierte Veränderung der sozialen Praktiken in Unternehmen zu bewirken. Durch die Nutzung von Artefakten kann die Veränderung zusätzlich abgesichert werden. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit werden in einem konzeptionellen Rahmen zusammengefasst, auf dessen Basis auch konkrete Gestaltungsempfehlungen gegeben werden.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30176">
    <title>Ratingmodell zur Quantifizierung des Ausfallrisikos von LBO-Finanzierungen</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30176</link>
    <description>Titel: Ratingmodell zur Quantifizierung des Ausfallrisikos von LBO-Finanzierungen
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Lang, Michael; Cremers, Heinz; Hentze, Rainald
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Credit risk measurement and management become more important in all financial institutions in the light of the current financial crisis and the global recession. This particularly applies to most of the complex structured financing forms whose risk cannot be quantified with com-mon rating methods. This paper explains the risk associated with leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions and demon-strates the implementation of a new rating method based on a logistic regression (logit func-tion), a rating system commonly used by banks. The system estimates probabilities of default for various time horizons between three months and two years. Input variables contain information about the transaction (based on financial covenants) as well as macroeconomic parameters. The most important factor is a firm&amp;#x2019;s cyclicality. Leve-rage and capital structure are statistically significant and are also utilized in this ratings sys-tem, however they are far less important compared to cyclicality when this method is em-ployed. The validation results demonstrate a very good calibration and discriminatory power between defaulting and non-defaulting LBO transactions.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30175">
    <title>Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30175</link>
    <description>Titel: Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Bannier, Christina E.; Behr, Patrick; Güttler, André
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: This paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Both self-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonable explanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996 and December 2006 show that rating conservatism may play a role for industrial firms, but self-selection cannot be fully rejected. Neither can it for insurance companies, though data restrictions impede further conclusions. For unsolicited bank ratings, however, we find strong evidence that rating conservatism is an important cause. The downward bias also appears to increase along with banks&amp;#x2019; opaqueness.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30174">
    <title>Outline of a Darwinian theory of money</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30174</link>
    <description>Titel: Outline of a Darwinian theory of money
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Building on Lea and Webley’s drug theory of money, the paper connects different theoretical resources to develop a Darwinian theory of money. The central empirical observation is the neuroeconomic result of the independent role of money as a reinforcer, which matches with a series of other insights into strong emotional impact of money use. Lea and Webley proposed that money piggybacks on a generalized instinct for social exchange. I put this into the more universal framework of the Darwinian concept of signal selection and Aunger’s theory of neuromemes. This can be related to Searle’s theory of institutions, especially with regard to his notion of neurophysiological dispositions as a basis for rule-following. Thus, neuroeconomics and institutional theory can be put into one coherent framework of Generalized Darwinism, taking money and its emergence as a case study.</description>
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