EconStor Community: Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83
Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics2016-05-25T13:17:01ZDemand rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed capacities: An experiment
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125820
Title: Demand rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed capacities: An experiment
Authors: Jacobs, Martin; Requate, Till
Abstract: This study is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed exogenous capacities. It is found that prices and profits are significantly higher under proportional than under efficient demand rationing. Moreover, the amount of capacity available to each firm is varied. In accordance with earlier studies, prices and profits are significantly higher when capacities are lower. Those effects accord qualitatively with the Nash equilibrium predictions of the corresponding stage games. However, the Nash equilibrium concept does poorly at quantitative predictions. Prices are significantly higher than the Nash prediction in all treatments, irrespective of whether the Nash equilibrium is in mixed or in pure strategies. Profits are higher than the Nash prediction with high capacities, but may converge to the equilibrium prediction in the long run with low capacities. The data of individual price choices feature dynamic patterns that can potentially be explained by both Edgeworth price cycles and imitation of the price set by the competitor.2016-01-01T00:00:00ZNumber of firms, rationing, matching, and knowledge: A comprehensive study of variations in experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125821
Title: Number of firms, rationing, matching, and knowledge: A comprehensive study of variations in experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets
Authors: Jacobs, Martin
Abstract: This study provides a comprehensive picture of experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets with capacity choice in the first stage and subsequent price competition at the second. We conduct seven different treatments of such markets, varying the number of firms, the demand rationing scheme, the subject matching, and subjects' knowledge about the market mechanism. We find that only the number of firms entails a persistent effect on capacity choices. Price choices are affected by both the number of firms and the rationing scheme. Subjects in the high-knowledge condition behave in the same manner from the first periods as subjects with low knowledge do in later periods after having gained experience. In all treatments conduct is generally more competitive than the Cournot outcome, irrespective of whether the Cournot outcome is the Nash equilibrium or not. Nevertheless, the Cournot model entails some predictive power. Exact Cournot choices are more likely to occur for both capacities and prices under efficient demand rationing, where the Cournot outcome is the equilibrium, than under proportional rationing.2016-01-01T00:00:00ZBertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading: Experimental evidence
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125822
Title: Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading: Experimental evidence
Authors: Jacobs, Martin; Requate, Till
Abstract: Price competition with increasing marginal costs, though relevant for many markets, appears as an under-researched field in the experimental oligopoly literature. We provide results from an experiment that varies the number of firms as well as the demand rationing and matching schemes in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading. We find that prices and profits are substantially higher in duopoly than in triopoly and with proportional compared to efficient demand rationing. The matching rule has little effect on prices and profits. Nash equilibrium predictions do not capture observed behavior. Neither the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the underlying one-shot game nor, for the fixed matching condition, the symmetric stationary outcome pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the infinitely repeated game are supported by the data. In contrast to results from related experiments, behavior is largely more competitive than predicted by Nash equilibrium theory. Individual pricing decisions can predominantly be explained by either myopic best responses (Edgeworth cycles) or simple imitative behavior, where the complexity of the decision situation plays a crucial role in which behavioral pattern applies.2016-01-01T00:00:00ZVolatility effects of news shocks in New Keynesian models with optimal monetary policy: Updated version
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130566
Title: Volatility effects of news shocks in New Keynesian models with optimal monetary policy: Updated version
Authors: Offick, Sven; Wohltmann, Hans-Werner
Abstract: This paper studies the volatility implications of anticipated cost-push shocks (i.e. news shocks) in a New Keynesian model with hybrid price setting both under optimal unrestricted and discretionary monetary policy with flexible inflation targeting. If the degree of backward-looking price setting behavior is sufficiently small (large), anticipated cost-push shocks lead in both policy regimes to a higher (lower) volatility in the output gap and in the central bank's loss than an unanticipated shock of the same size. This inversion of the volatility effects of news shocks follows from the inverse relation between the price-setting behavior and the optimal monetary policy. Under a fully microfounded hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve with price indexation, this inversion of volatility results is not possible since the Phillips curve remains hybrid even in the limit case of full price indexation.2016-01-01T00:00:00Z