<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Community: Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80</link>
    <description>(Beschreibung)</description>
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32326" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32327" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32324" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32325" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  <textInput>
    <title>The Community's Suchmaschine</title>
    <description>Durchsuchen Sie den Kanal</description>
    <name>Suchen</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32326">
    <title>Reduction of regulatory risk: a network economic approach</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32326</link>
    <description>Titel: Reduction of regulatory risk: a network economic approach
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Knieps, Günter; Weiß, Hans-Jörg
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Several definitions of regulatory risk are known from the literature. From the perspective of regulatory reform it is important to differentiate between the impact of a given regulatory scheme on the firm's risk exposure and the risk arising from discretionary behavior of regulatory agencies. Whereas the conse-quences of effective regulation in principle are known and accepted, excessive regulatory discretion may cause a strong need for regulatory reform. Regulatory reform focussing on the regulatory base risk and the regulatory instrument risk has to solve the problem of the optimal division of labour between regulatory discretion and statutory constraints. Therefore, in this paper the design of a disaggregated regulatory mandate is elaborated; its major elements being the restriction of regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks and a disaggregated appli-cation of sector-specific regulatory instruments.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32327">
    <title>Die LKW-Maut und die drei Grundprobleme der Verkehrsinfrastrukturpolitik</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32327</link>
    <description>Titel: Die LKW-Maut und die drei Grundprobleme der Verkehrsinfrastrukturpolitik
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Knieps, Günter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Benutzungsgebühren für Wegeinfrastrukturen haben keineswegs nur eine Finazierungsfunktion, sondern stellen auch ein geeignetes Instrument zur Allokation knapper Infrastrukturkapazitäten dar. Da die Opportunitätskosten der Inan-spruchnahme von knappen Wegeinfrastrukturkapazitäten von allen Benutzergruppen abhängen, sind alle Nutzergruppen bei der Erhebung von Benutzungs-gebühren einzubeziehen, also neben den schweren Lkw auch leichte Lkw, Busse und Pkw auf den Straßen. Zur Glättung der Verkehrsströme im Tages-, Wochen- und Saisonverlauf erscheint es sinnvoll, zeitlich differenzierte Staugebühren nach dem Prinzip der Spitzenlasttarifierung einzuführen. Mehrstufige Tarife mit periodenbezogener Grundgebühr und variabler Leistungsgebühr, wie sie im Eisenbahnverkehr schon praktiziert werden, können auch im Straßenverkehr An-wendung finden.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32324">
    <title>Telecommunications markets in the stranglehold of EU regulation: on the need for a disaggregated regulatory contract</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32324</link>
    <description>Titel: Telecommunications markets in the stranglehold of EU regulation: on the need for a disaggregated regulatory contract
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Knieps, Günter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: The increasing complexity of EU regulation is resulting in a tangle of contradictory decisions and statements, involving also new markets, such as interactive cable television, Internet etc. Whereas in the past sector-specific regulation has been applied in a discretionary manner in order to correct the rules of the market game, the really challenging task for the future seems to be the development and implementation of statu- tory constraints for the regulatory authorities in order to guarantee a predictable regulation of market power. For this purpose the design and implementation of a disaggre- gated regulatory contract on the statutory level (EU Directives and national law) is derived, which should be an essential principle in the EU Review 2006. Its basic components consist of limiting regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks, exploiting the phasingout potentials, and a disaggregated application of regulatory instruments. In con- trast, the problem of opportunistic regulatory behaviour with respect to irreversible investments can be solved by the application of the already existing statutory constraint of the Framework Directive guaranteeing financial viability.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32325">
    <title>Wettbewerb im transeuropäischen Eisenbahnverkehr</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32325</link>
    <description>Titel: Wettbewerb im transeuropäischen Eisenbahnverkehr
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Autoren: Knieps, Günter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Zusammenfassung: Efficient competition on European rail transport markets is conditional upon the existence of non-discriminatory access to infrastructure for all active and potential transport service providers. In addition, however, efforts must also be made to ensure scarce infrastructure capacities are allocated efficiently and infrastructure costs are covered. This paper analyzes the possibilities of transborder inter-operability of train control systems by means of competition among train control agencies. Furthermore, the potentials of cooperation and coordination of track capacity allocation between railway companies is considered. Finally, the current evolution of the trans-European railway infrastructures is considered.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

