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    <title>EconStor Community: Brown University</title>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62672">
    <title>Isolation and development</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62672</link>
    <description>Title: Isolation and development
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Ashraf, Quamrul; Galor, Oded; Ozak, Omer
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper exploits cross-country variation in the degree of geographical isolation, prior to the advent of sea-faring and airborne transportation technologies, to examine its impact on the course of economic development across the globe. The empirical investigation establishes that prehistoric geographical isolation has generated a persistent beneficial effect on the process of development and contributed to the contemporary variation in the standard of living across countries.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62671">
    <title>In broad daylight: Full information and higher-order punishment opportunities promote cooperation</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62671</link>
    <description>Title: In broad daylight: Full information and higher-order punishment opportunities promote cooperation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Kameik, Kenju; Putterman, Louis
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higher-order punishment increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing, including its past history, and opportunities to punish are unrestricted. Availability of higher-order punishment reduces cooperation and efficiency if it is restricted to counter-punishing alone, if past history is unavailable, and if there is a dedicated counter-punishment stage.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62669">
    <title>Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62669</link>
    <description>Title: Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the group reach a decision by voting whether each premise is true or false, or should they simply vote on the outcome? We show that for any finite number of individuals, the premise-based voting rule is more efficient in aggregating information than the outcome-based rule. However, generically, the gain from using the premise-based over the outcome-based rule can only be marginal when numerous individuals express independent opinions. Indeed, the outcome-based game is almost always asymptotically efficient.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62670">
    <title>Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62670</link>
    <description>Title: Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Feldman, Allan M.; Serrano, Roberto
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a model with only one preference profile. Both versions are transparent, requiring minimal mathematical sophistication. The first version assumes there are only two people in society, whose preferences are being aggregated; the second version assumes two or more people. Both theorems rely on assumptions about diversity of preferences, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at some length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to illustrate our points.</description>
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