<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Collection: Discussion Papers, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, WZB</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62005</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74481" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74480" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74481" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74480" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  <textInput>
    <title>The Collection's search engine</title>
    <description>Search the Channel</description>
    <name>search</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74481">
    <title>Endogenous group formation in experimental contests</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74481</link>
    <description>Title: Endogenous group formation in experimental contests
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental threeplayer contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending effort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74480">
    <title>Evolutionary determinants of war</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74480</link>
    <description>Title: Evolutionary determinants of war
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players' evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74481">
    <title>Endogenous group formation in experimental contests</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74481</link>
    <description>Title: Endogenous group formation in experimental contests
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental threeplayer contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending effort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74480">
    <title>Evolutionary determinants of war</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74480</link>
    <description>Title: Evolutionary determinants of war
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players' evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

