<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Collection: Discussion Papers, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, WZB</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54351</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71138" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71137" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71136" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71138" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  <textInput>
    <title>The Collection's search engine</title>
    <description>Search the Channel</description>
    <name>search</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71138">
    <title>Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71138</link>
    <description>Title: Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player: being in a group lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this might harm the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguish between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71137">
    <title>Preference for randomization: Empirical and experimental evidence</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71137</link>
    <description>Title: Preference for randomization: Empirical and experimental evidence
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We investigate violations of consequentialism in the form of the stochastic dominance property. The property is shared by many theories of choice and implies that the decisionmaker prefers receiving the best outcome for sure over all lotteries that involve multiple outcomes. We run experiments to demonstrate that dominated randomization can be attractive. In treatments where decision-makers are asked to submit multiple decisions without knowing which one is relevant, many participants submit contradictory sets of decisions and thereby induce a dominated lottery between outcomes. Explicit choice of non-consequentialist randomization is observed in a separate treatment. A possible reason for the effect is the desire to avoid having to make the decision. A large data set on (highstake) university applications in Germany shows patterns that are consistent with a preference for randomization.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71136">
    <title>'I'll do it by myself as I knew it all along': On the failure of hindsight-biased principals to delegate optimally</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71136</link>
    <description>Title: 'I'll do it by myself as I knew it all along': On the failure of hindsight-biased principals to delegate optimally
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Danz, David; Hüber, Frank; Kübler, Dorothea; Mechtenberg, Lydia; Schmid, Julia
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010 participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the ongoing World Cup and had to recall their assessments after the outcomes had been realized. This served as a measure of the hindsight bias for each participant. The participants also had to make choices in a delegation game. Our data confirm that hindsight-biased subjects more frequently fail to delegate optimally than subjects whom we have classified as not hindsight biased.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71138">
    <title>Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71138</link>
    <description>Title: Hanging together or being hung separately: The strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player: being in a group lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this might harm the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguish between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

