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    <title>EconStor Collection: ADB Institute Discussion Papers, Asian Development Bank Institute</title>
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    <title>Financial reform: Benefits and inherent risks</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53544</link>
    <description>Title: Financial reform: Benefits and inherent risks
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Lee, Jisoon</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53543">
    <title>Export growth and industrial policy: Lessons from the East Asian miracle experience</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53543</link>
    <description>Title: Export growth and industrial policy: Lessons from the East Asian miracle experience
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Weiss, John</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53542">
    <title>Regional monetary units for East Asia: Lessons from Europe</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53542</link>
    <description>Title: Regional monetary units for East Asia: Lessons from Europe
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Steinherr, Alfred; Girardin, Eric
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper we report the European experience with a basket currency, the ECU. The ECU was initially introduced as a reference unit and later became the anchor of the European Monetary System. Public policy was complemented by private sector initiatives and use of the ECU for denomination of financial instruments. In practice, it turned out that a basket currency entails considerable unexpected technical complexities. The technical particularities of a basket currency are discussed before we turn to the criteria for determining the shares of participating currencies. We show that there are no iron-clad economic principles and therefore there is some room for political considerations. In Europe three criteria were used for determining the weights: GDP shares, international trade shares, and financial market indicators. In addition, weights will change with exchange rate movements. Appreciating currencies will experience increasing weights and depreciating currencies decreasing weights. This may require a correction mechanism for political acceptability. In Europe, weights were rescaled by political authorities every five years. From an economic viewpoint, weights depend critically on the purpose of the basket currency: is it a reference indicator, is it a currency for international transactions, or is it a parallel currency? Thus, before weights are to be discussed a clear vision of the role of the basket currency would be desirable. The vastly different growth performance among Asian economies also suggests a preference to forward rather than backward-looking measures. Turning then to the different functions of a basket currency, we examine the use of basket currencies as a divergence indicator, or as a financial instrument in regional finan</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53541">
    <title>Bilateral trade agreements and the world trading system</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53541</link>
    <description>Title: Bilateral trade agreements and the world trading system
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Menon, Jayant
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The interest in forming BTAs has been growing at a phenomenal rate. In the Asia-Pacific region alone, the number of BTAs has more than tripled over the past 5 years, from 57 in 2002 to 176 in October 2006. There are more than 300 worldwide. In this paper, we try to explain the proliferation of BTAs by identifying the underlying motivations behind them. We identify a set of general and specific factors involved. The general factors related to disenchantment with progress of the WTO; snowballing and domino effects as a result of countries not wanting to be left behind; lower visibility and thus lower resistance from opposing forces; and pure politics driven directly by politicians or political parties. There are three broad categories of specific factors that we identify: economic; strategic and event driven. Each are further divided into sub-categories and in total we identify 11 specific factors to explain the proliferation of BTAs. Next we look at the impact of BTAs on multilateralism and the world trading system. In general, it is would appear that the sheer number of BTAs and their continued rapid growth is fragmenting the world trading system. The most obvious effect is the much discussed spaghetti-bowl effect. It is also distracting, and drawing scarce resources away from the multilateral effort. But the story is not that simple or straight-forward once we consider specific factors. The fallacy of division applies because the motivation in pursuing a BTA can determine if its impact on the world trading system is positive or negative. Most of the event driven BTAs appear to either support multilateralism or have a positive effect on the world trading system. All of the strategically motivated BTAs appear to have a negative effect. Of the economically motivated BTAs, sector expanding and market restoring BTAs have the potential of supporting the multilateral process, while market creating and sector excluding BTAs appear to threaten it. Finally, we look at what the future might hold. Are BTAs likely to continue proliferating? It seems that they will until the world trading system is so distorted that countries will be forced to seek a remedy. This response may take several forms. One is the consolidation of BTAs into region-wide PTAs, or blocks, where the various BTAs between members belonging to the same region become largely redundant. For instance, an Asia-wide FTA would supersede a host of regional BTAs and consolidate them into one region-wide agreement. Although this may reduce the number of intra-regional BTAs, it may serve to further fragment the world trading system by carving it up into distinct regional blocks. Furthermore, it may provide fresh impetus for a new wave of market restoring BTAs as traditional trade partners outside the region seek to retain trade access with members of the consolidated PTA. In fact, with more countries outside the region that inside, it is possible that the total number of BTAs could actually increase. Thus, consolidation through region-wide PTAs is not the remedy to the problems facing the world trading system. The second response may come in the form of the completion of the Doha round with minimum compromises. A bona fide conclusion to the Doha Round should dilute preferences that are currently scattered around the world, and take away much of the incentive to continue pursuing BTAs. If this happens, then the proliferation of BTAs would have contributed to their eventual demise, in terms of their impact on the world trading system. This is much more like a remedy to the problems facing the world trading system. But what is the Doha round fails, or is concluded in such a watered-down form that its impact is minimal? Although this may provide an additional incentive to pursue more BTAs and PTAs, there may eventually come a point where countries may voluntarily seek a remedy that lies in their own best interests. Not only is the cost of administering and implementing multiple country-specific BTAs high, it rises with the number of BTAs. Once a country has concluded BTAs with most of its major trading partners, it makes sense to: equalize preferences across these BTAs and offer them to non-BTA countries on an MFN basis. This would remove the administrative burden, and eliminate distortions to country and global trade patterns. As it is with reversing much of second-best policies, it is the actual realized cost of implementation rather than any potential unrealized benefits that usually drives the process. And there are significant potential unrealized benefits that will accrue to the country concerned as well as the world trading system if this process of multilateralizing preferences is pursued, whatever the reason.</description>
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