<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Community: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Braunschweig</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51241</link>
    <description>Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department</description>
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51321" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51320" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51319" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51318" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  
  <textInput>
    <title>The Community's search engine</title>
    <description>Search the Channel</description>
    <name>search</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51321">
    <title>When to regulate airports: A simple rule</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51321</link>
    <description>Title: When to regulate airports: A simple rule
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Kratzsch, Uwe; Sieg, Gernot
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Landing fees at airports are regulated almost all over the world since airports are assumed to abuse their market power. We find that monopolistic airports have an incentive to restrain landing fees when they generate additional non-aviation revenues and that the optimal landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, we show that monopolistic airports will not have an incentive to abuse their market power anymore so that a price regulation becomes inappropriate as soon as non-aviation revenues increase above 50% of all airport revenues.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51320">
    <title>Eine ökonomische Analyse einer Ausweitung des Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetzes</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51320</link>
    <description>Title: Eine ökonomische Analyse einer Ausweitung des Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetzes
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Kratzsch, Uwe
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Nach wie vor wird in der deutschen Politik über eine Ausweitung des Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetzes und die damit einhergehende Einführung branchenspezifischer Mindestlöhne in weiteren Branchen der deutschen Wirtschaft diskutiert. Auch wenn die Forderungen von Gewerkschaften und Politikern nach mehr Mindestlöhnen in Deutschland sicherlich gut gemeint und durchaus verständlich sind, müssen sie aus ökonomischer Sicht abgelehnt werden. Um die Gewinne, welche die Globalisierung verspricht, realisieren und die nach wie vor hohe Arbeitslosigkeit hierzulande nachhaltig senken zu können, benötigt Deutschland einen funktionierenden Arbeitsmarkt mit einer flexiblen Lohnstruktur. Weitere Mindestlöhne würden die Probleme auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt dagegen eher verschärfen.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51319">
    <title>Welfare effects of subsidizing a dead-end network of less polluting vehicles</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51319</link>
    <description>Title: Welfare effects of subsidizing a dead-end network of less polluting vehicles
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dietrich, Antje-Mareike; Sieg, Gernot
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This article shows that in the presence of environmental externalities, it may be welfare enhancing to overcome a technological lock-in by a deadend technology through governmental intervention. It is socially desirable to subsidize a dead-end technology if its environmental externality is small relative to the one of the established technology, if the installed base and/or the strength of the network effect is small and if future generations matter. Applying our results to the private transport sector, governments promoting alternatives to gasoline-driven vehicles have to be aware of these opposing welfare effects.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51318">
    <title>Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51318</link>
    <description>Title: Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Rothbauer, Julia; Sieg, Gernot
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This study analyzes the minimum quality standard set by the European Union (EU) through Regulation 1371/2007 of Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations. A welfare maximizing quality standard raises quality and consumer satisfaction, but does not improve the modal split of rail transport. A minimum quality standard determined by political majorities may or may not increase welfare. However, all binding standards induce travelers to switch to transport modes with higher anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

