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    <title>EconStor Collection: UFZ-Diskussionspapiere, Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften, Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ)</title>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71063">
    <title>On the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits in a setting of uncertain abatement costs and market power: A case against the invariably pessimistic view</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71063</link>
    <description>Title: On the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits in a setting of uncertain abatement costs and market power: A case against the invariably pessimistic view
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Heuson, Clemens
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Recent work has shown that Weitzman's policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable emission permits are ruled out since market power gives rise to strategic permit trading, which requires some separate effort in investigation. This paper aims at closing this gap and, in doing so, makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first-time full comparative analysis of the three most common pollution control instruments stated above which takes into account two features that are frequently given in actual regulation settings, namely market power of polluting firms and uncertain abatement costs from the regulator's perspective. Second, the paper reveals a new form of strategic permit trading that may arise even though the permit market is perfectly competitive. Finally, the rather pessimistic view concerning the impact of market power on the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits, which dominates in the literature so far, is put into context.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71063">
    <title>On the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits in a setting of uncertain abatement costs and market power: A case against the invariably pessimistic view</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71063</link>
    <description>Title: On the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits in a setting of uncertain abatement costs and market power: A case against the invariably pessimistic view
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Heuson, Clemens
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Recent work has shown that Weitzman's policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable emission permits are ruled out since market power gives rise to strategic permit trading, which requires some separate effort in investigation. This paper aims at closing this gap and, in doing so, makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first-time full comparative analysis of the three most common pollution control instruments stated above which takes into account two features that are frequently given in actual regulation settings, namely market power of polluting firms and uncertain abatement costs from the regulator's perspective. Second, the paper reveals a new form of strategic permit trading that may arise even though the permit market is perfectly competitive. Finally, the rather pessimistic view concerning the impact of market power on the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits, which dominates in the literature so far, is put into context.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69622">
    <title>A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU: How do the emissions trading scheme and support for renewable energies interact?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69622</link>
    <description>Title: A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU: How do the emissions trading scheme and support for renewable energies interact?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Gawel, Erik; Strunz, Sebastian; Lehmann, Paul
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the rationale for an energy policy mix when the European Emissions Trading scheme (ETS) is considered from a public choice perspective. That is, we argue that the economic textbook model of the ETS implausibly assumes 1) efficient policy design and 2) climate protection as the single objective of policy intervention. Contrary to these assumptions, we propose that the ETS originates from a political bargaining game within a context of multiple policy objectives. In particular, the emissions cap is negotiated between regulators and emitters with the emitters' abatement costs as crucial bargaining variable. This public choice view yields striking implications for an optimal policy mix comprising RES supporting policies. Whereas the textbook model implies that the ETS alone provides sufficient climate protection, our analysis suggests that support for renewable energies 1) contributes to a more effective ETS-design and 2) may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy policy if other externalities and policy objectives besides climate protection are considered. Thus, our analysis also shows that a public choice view not necessarily entails negative evaluations concerning efficiency and effectiveness of a policy mix.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69622">
    <title>A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU: How do the emissions trading scheme and support for renewable energies interact?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69622</link>
    <description>Title: A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU: How do the emissions trading scheme and support for renewable energies interact?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Gawel, Erik; Strunz, Sebastian; Lehmann, Paul
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the rationale for an energy policy mix when the European Emissions Trading scheme (ETS) is considered from a public choice perspective. That is, we argue that the economic textbook model of the ETS implausibly assumes 1) efficient policy design and 2) climate protection as the single objective of policy intervention. Contrary to these assumptions, we propose that the ETS originates from a political bargaining game within a context of multiple policy objectives. In particular, the emissions cap is negotiated between regulators and emitters with the emitters' abatement costs as crucial bargaining variable. This public choice view yields striking implications for an optimal policy mix comprising RES supporting policies. Whereas the textbook model implies that the ETS alone provides sufficient climate protection, our analysis suggests that support for renewable energies 1) contributes to a more effective ETS-design and 2) may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy policy if other externalities and policy objectives besides climate protection are considered. Thus, our analysis also shows that a public choice view not necessarily entails negative evaluations concerning efficiency and effectiveness of a policy mix.</description>
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