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    <title>EconStor Community: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)</title>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787">
    <title>From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787</link>
    <description>Title: From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Chen, Yan; Onur, Kesten
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74786">
    <title>An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74786</link>
    <description>Title: An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hugh-Jones, David; Kurino, Morimitsu; Vanberg, Christoph
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit in doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787">
    <title>From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787</link>
    <description>Title: From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Chen, Yan; Onur, Kesten
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74786">
    <title>An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74786</link>
    <description>Title: An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hugh-Jones, David; Kurino, Morimitsu; Vanberg, Christoph
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit in doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation.</description>
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