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    <title>EconStor Collection: Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2008 (Zürich)</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39867</link>
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    <title>Public participation and willingness to cooperate in common-pool resource management: a field experiment with fishing communities in Brazil</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39916</link>
    <description>Title: Public participation and willingness to cooperate in common-pool resource management: a field experiment with fishing communities in Brazil
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Cavalcanti, Carina; Schläpfer, Felix; Schmid, Bernhard
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The primary evidence about the factors determining successful self-governance of common-pool resources (CPR) has come from case studies. More recently, this observational evidence has been complemented by insights from economic experiments. Here we advance a third approach in which the role of local deliberation about the management of a fishery resource is investigated in a field experiment. Using three control and three treatment communities in a freshwater fishery, we tested if participation in developing specific measures for community-based sustainable CPR management increased the willingness to contribute to the implementation of these measures. Each community was also exposed to information about their community leader's advice about the proposed measures. Both participation and leader advice affected the willingness of participants to contribute to one of three concrete proposals. However, the strongest influence on individual willingness to contribute was exerted by the individual beliefs about the cooperation of others in CPR management.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39915">
    <title>Grow rich and clean up later? International assistance and the provision of environmental quality in low- and middle-income countries</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39915</link>
    <description>Title: Grow rich and clean up later? International assistance and the provision of environmental quality in low- and middle-income countries
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Ruoff, Gabi
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper deals with the question whether low- and middle-income countries that are politically better integrated into the international system are able to provide higher levels of environmental quality than could be expected only according to their national income levels. Using time-series cross-section regression analysis of 110 countries for the period 1950-1999 it can be shown that those countries that have signed and ratified more environmental treaties, have significantly lower SO2 emissions than countries that are less integrated into the international system. However, in contrast to theoretical predictions democratic low- and middle-income countries despite their stronger integration into the international system exhibit higher SO2 emissions indicating lower environmental quality than autocratic countries.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39914">
    <title>Inflation and Democracy in Former Extractive Colonies Analysis with a New Instrumental Variable</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39914</link>
    <description>Title: Inflation and Democracy in Former Extractive Colonies Analysis with a New Instrumental Variable
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Mijiyawa, Abdoul
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the link between inflation and democracy in developing countries. In order to address the endogeneity issue of democracy, I use the date of political independence as an instrument for democratic institutions. The application of the criterion of Stock and Yogo (2002, 2005) for weak instrumental variable in my sample reveals that, the independence date is a good instrument for democratic institutions. Using five years pooled data covering the period 1960-2003, and a sample of 62 developing countries former extractive colonies (including 32 African countries); I find a robust positive causal relationship between inflation and democracy. It appears that democracy increases inflation because democracy stimulates money creation and compromises trade liberalization in my sample of developing countries. Case studies based on Chile, Ghana, and Sri Lanka better illustrate the result relating to the relationship between inflation and democracy in my sample.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39913">
    <title>Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises An empirical analysis</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39913</link>
    <description>Title: Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises An empirical analysis
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dreher, Axel; Gassebner, Martin
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We examine whether and under which circumstances World Bank projects and IMF programs affect the likelihood of major government crises. Using a sample of more than 90 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, we find that crises are on average more likely in the presence of Bank and Fund involvement. While the effect of the IMF to some extent depends on the model specification, the impact of the World Bank is shown to be robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation. We also find that governments face an increasing risk to enter a crisis when they remain under IFI programs when the economy performs better. The (economic) conditions present when a new IFI program is initiated, however, do not play a major role for crisis probability. Finally, only programs concluded by the current government affect crises, while those inherited by preceding governments do not.</description>
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