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    <title>EconStor Community: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln</title>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74722">
    <title>Who cares about financialization? Explaining the decline in political salience of active markets for corporate control</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74722</link>
    <description>Title: Who cares about financialization? Explaining the decline in political salience of active markets for corporate control
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Callaghan, Helen
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Why is unprecedented financialization failing to provoke a strong political backlash? The role of financial markets, motives, actors, and institutions has expanded continuously in recent decades, but - contrary to Polanyi's 'double movement' theory and despite the current financial crisis - market-containment efforts have grown weaker over time. The present paper approaches this puzzle by explaining how the practice of corporate takeover bids gradually gained political acceptance in the United Kingdom from the 1950s onward. Through its expansion, the market for corporate control contributed directly to eroding political resistance by triggering processes of routinization, adaptation, and elimination. Routinization decreases issue salience for 'average voters' because it lowers the news value of takeover bids. Adaptation to new profit opportunities increases the number of beneficiaries from takeover bids, thereby bolstering promarket clienteles. Elimination of stakeholder-oriented companies - through constant exposure to takeover threats - demoralizes the opponents of active markets for corporate control by leaving them with less to fight for. Empirical evidence is drawn mainly from qualitative and quantitative analysis of British parliamentary debates regarding takeover bids between 1953 and 2011.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74722">
    <title>Who cares about financialization? Explaining the decline in political salience of active markets for corporate control</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74722</link>
    <description>Title: Who cares about financialization? Explaining the decline in political salience of active markets for corporate control
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Callaghan, Helen
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Why is unprecedented financialization failing to provoke a strong political backlash? The role of financial markets, motives, actors, and institutions has expanded continuously in recent decades, but - contrary to Polanyi's 'double movement' theory and despite the current financial crisis - market-containment efforts have grown weaker over time. The present paper approaches this puzzle by explaining how the practice of corporate takeover bids gradually gained political acceptance in the United Kingdom from the 1950s onward. Through its expansion, the market for corporate control contributed directly to eroding political resistance by triggering processes of routinization, adaptation, and elimination. Routinization decreases issue salience for 'average voters' because it lowers the news value of takeover bids. Adaptation to new profit opportunities increases the number of beneficiaries from takeover bids, thereby bolstering promarket clienteles. Elimination of stakeholder-oriented companies - through constant exposure to takeover threats - demoralizes the opponents of active markets for corporate control by leaving them with less to fight for. Empirical evidence is drawn mainly from qualitative and quantitative analysis of British parliamentary debates regarding takeover bids between 1953 and 2011.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70248">
    <title>Erkennen, was die Welt zusammenhält: Die Finanzmarktkrise als Herausforderung für die soziologische Systemtheorie</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70248</link>
    <description>Title: Erkennen, was die Welt zusammenhält: Die Finanzmarktkrise als Herausforderung für die soziologische Systemtheorie
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Mayntz, Renate
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob eine Systemtheorie, in deren Zentrum die funktionelle Differenzierung steht, einen analytischen Rahmen für eine über die deskriptive Auflistung einzelner Faktoren hinausgehende Erklärung der zu der jüngsten internationalen Krise des Finanzsystems führenden Entwicklung bietet. Die Frage ließe sich nur bejahen, wenn funktionelle Differenzierung auf Leistung bezogen wird, das Finanzsystem als von der produzierenden Wirtschaft getrenntes Teilsystem betrachtet wird und das Eigeninteresse der Akteure im Teilsystem sowie die von externen Akteuren tatsächlich nachgefragten Leistungen in die Analyse einbezogen werden. Das würde verlangen, der Systemtheorie einen akteurtheoretischen Boden einzuziehen. Da damit Macht ins Zentrum der Analyse rückt, müsste auch die Verschränkung funktioneller und stratifikatorischer Differenzierung thematisiert werden. Diese theoretischen Modifikationen und Erweiterungen passen kaum unter das Dach der gängigen Theorie funktioneller Differenzierung, sondern begründen einen anderen, zugleich stärker historischen analytischen Ansatz.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70247">
    <title>Diagnosis, treatment, and effects of the crisis in Greece: A 'special case' or a 'test case'?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70247</link>
    <description>Title: Diagnosis, treatment, and effects of the crisis in Greece: A 'special case' or a 'test case'?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Markantonatou, Maria
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper discusses the management of the crisis in Greece, arguing that it was based on a series of diagnoses that justified fiscal discipline by stigmatizing the Greek economy and society, and that it had a narrow understanding of the reasons for Greece's deteriorating competitiveness. I begin by critically examining a series of diagnoses that take a 'rent-seeking' approach as a common starting point. I then argue that the chosen treatment of 'internal devaluation' was based on questionable perceptions of labor costs and public expenditure during the pre-crisis period in Greece, a treatment which then aggravated recession. I follow up with an overview of the socio-political consequences of the crisis (unemployment, poverty, social deregulation, rise of neofascism). In conclusion, I point to the premises of methodological nationalism, both in neoliberal and neo-Keynesian understandings of the crisis. Such views disregard the fact that states have prioritized the strengthening of the global financial system and its rescue in times of crisis, as well as the process of a deepening neoliberalism within the EU - even at a constitutional level through the Fiscal Compact - in which management of the Greek crisis has been inscribed.</description>
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