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    <title>EconStor Collection: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods</title>
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    <title>Antitrust law and the promotion of democracy and economic growth</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57523</link>
    <description>Title: Antitrust law and the promotion of democracy and economic growth
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Petersen, Niels
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: There is a considerable debate in the legal literature about the purpose of antitrust institutions. Some argue that antitrust law merely serves the purpose of economic growth, while others have a broader perspective on the function of antitrust, maintaining that the prevention of economic concentration is an important means to promote democratization and democratic stability. This contribution seeks to test the empirical assumptions of this normative debate. Using panel data of 154 states from 1960 to 2007, it analyzes whether antitrust law actually has a positive effect on democracy and economic growth. The paper finds that antitrust law has a strongly positive effect on the level of GDP per capita and economic growth. However, there is no significant positive effect on the level of democracy. It is suggested that these results might be due to the current structure of existing antitrust laws, which are designed to promote economic efficiency rather than to prevent economic concentration.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57522">
    <title>The impact of firm entry regulation on long-living entrants</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57522</link>
    <description>Title: The impact of firm entry regulation on long-living entrants
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Prantl, Susanne
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: What is the impact of firm entry regulation on sustained entry into self-employment? How does firm entry regulation influence the performance of long-living entrants? In this paper, I address these questions by exploiting a natural experiment in firm entry regulation. After German reunification, East and West Germany faced different economic conditions, but fell under the same law that imposes a substantial mandatory standard on entrepreneurs who want to start a legally independent firm in one of the regulated occupations. The empirical results suggest that the entry regulation suppresses long-living entrants, not only entrants in general or transient, short-lived entrants. This effect on the number of long-living entrants is not accompanied by a counteracting effect on the performance of long-living entrants, as measured by firm size several years after entry.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57521">
    <title>Too much information sharing? Welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57521</link>
    <description>Title: Too much information sharing? Welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Ganuza, Juan José; Jansen, Jos
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists' information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms' incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms' information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57520">
    <title>Assuring adequate deterrence in tort: A public good experiment</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57520</link>
    <description>Title: Assuring adequate deterrence in tort: A public good experiment
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Eisenberg, Theodore; Engel, Christoph
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: To explore damage rules' deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punishment to rules used in actual civil litigation. The experimental treatments are analogous to: (1) damages limited to harm to an individual litigant, (2) damages limited to harm to a group available in aggregate litigation, such as class actions, and (3) damages allowed beyond actual harm to victims, such as punitive damages. The treatment with damages limited to harm to an individual does not prevent the deterioration in cooperation over time commonly found in public good experiments without punishment or with too low punishment. In the class action damages treatment, cooperation is stable over time. In the damages-beyond-harm treatment, cooperation approaches the optimal level, but concerns of socially unjust punishment arise. In all treatments, a money maximising agent would be expected to completely freeride and make no contribution to the public good. Our results can thus not be explained by an incentive effect. Rather we find that social preferences interact with the severity of sanctions, even if imposing the sanction is not altruistic, but instead financially benefits the sanctioning authority. The results persist in a variation of the three treatments in which the player imposing damages has the option to not retain them for herself but to have them forfeited with no benefit to her. We can therefore rule out that the beneficial effect of sanctions hinges on the participants knowing that the player imposing sanctions cannot intend to enrich herself. The methodology we develop could be used to assess the social welfare benefit of many damages rules, such as treble damages in antitrust cases and caps on damages common in medical malpractice cases and punitive damages cases.</description>
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