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    <title>EconStor Community: University of Minnesota</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/291</link>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58354">
    <title>A theory of demand for gambles</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58354</link>
    <description>Title: A theory of demand for gambles
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Nyman, John A.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Although gambling is primarily an economic activity, no single theory of the demand for gambles has gained wide-spread acceptance among economists. This paper proposes a simple model of the demand for gambling that is based on the standard economic assumptions that (1) resources are scarce and (2) consumers utility increases with income at a decreasing rate. This model has the advantages that (1) it is based solely on changes in income, (2) is potentially applicable to most consumers, (3) preserves the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of income, (4) is consistent with the insurance-buying gambler, and (5) has intuitive appeal.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58353">
    <title>An ANC payoff function for networks with sequentially Nash coherent plans</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58353</link>
    <description>Title: An ANC payoff function for networks with sequentially Nash coherent plans
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Nieva, Ricardo
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: I add endogenous bargaining possibilities do develop criteria to determine which statements are credible in a three-player model with complete information where pairs, in a sequential order, can formulate simultaneous negotiation statements. Joint plans are credible if they are the outcome of a plan Nash bargaining problem - the pair bargains cooperatively over the equilibrium payoffs induced by tenable and reliable plans - unless one or both bargainers are indifferent to bargaining. Then, a credible plan is up to the future-request by the oldest pair (of friends) among the past pairs that successfully cooperated and included one of the indifferent players. I interpret this model as an almost non cooperative (ANC) modification of the three-player Aumann-Myerson (1988) sequential network formation game. Whenever discussing a link two players can bargain non cooperatively out of the sum of their Myerson values (1977) in the prospective network and enunciate simultaneous negotiation statements. The disagreement plan suggests link rejection. Sequentially Nash (1950) coherent plans can be defined and exist. Analytical payoffs are unique. In strictly superadditive cooperative games the complete graph never forms.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23499">
    <title>The Market for Liars: Reputation and Auditor Honesty</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23499</link>
    <description>Title: The Market for Liars: Reputation and Auditor Honesty
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: McLennan, Andrew
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while "disreputable" auditors accept bribes because even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees, and have economic profits accruing to reputation; (b) as the fraction of auditors who are honest increases, the premium charged by reputable auditors eventually decreases, which diminishes the incentive to refuse bribes; (c) if the fraction of honest auditors exceeds an upper bound, there does not exist a two-tier equilibrium; (d) thus the reputation mechanism may be undermined by entry into the honest segment of the industry, if it is possible; (e) increasing auditor independence increases the upper bound.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23498">
    <title>Economic Effects of Liberalization: The Case of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23498</link>
    <description>Title: Economic Effects of Liberalization: The Case of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bajona, Claustre; Chu, Tianshu
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Many developing economies have joined or applied to join the WTO as part of their process of transformation to market-oriented economies. Accession to the WTO involves provisions to liberalize capital markets and to significantly reduce domestic industrial subsidies to the, usually large, state-owned sector. Therefore, any welfare gains derived from such policies are to be considered as part of the welfare gains of trade liberalization. In this paper we develop a dynamic applied general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the welfare benefits of capital market liberalization and domestic industrial policy reform, and we apply it to the case of China's accession to the WTO. We find that most of China's benefits of accessing the WTO are derived from the reduction of the state-owned sector driven by the reform in domestic policy required by the treaty. The highest welfare benefits occur when both domestic policy reform and capital market liberalization are jointly implemented. Welfare is enhanced by early opening of the capital markets.</description>
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