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    <title>EconStor Collection: FEEM Working Papers</title>
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    <title>A new capital regulation for large financial institutions</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53428</link>
    <description>Title: A new capital regulation for large financial institutions
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Hart, Oliver; Zingales, Luigi
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain an equity cushion sufficiently great that their own credit default swap price stays below a threshold level, and a cushion of long term bonds sufficiently large that, even if the equity is wiped out, the systemically relevant obligations are safe. If the CDS price goes above the threshold, the LFI regulator forces the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price moves back down. If this does not happen within a predetermined period of time, the regulator intervenes. We show that this mechanism ensures that LFIs are always solvent, while preserving some of the disciplinary effects of debt.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53427">
    <title>Environmental regulations, market structure and technological progress in renewable energy technology: A panel data study on wind turbines</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53427</link>
    <description>Title: Environmental regulations, market structure and technological progress in renewable energy technology: A panel data study on wind turbines
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Rübbelke, Dirk; Weiss, Pia
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study the impact of environmental regulations on the patent activities for wind turbines between 1980 and 2008. We explicitly control for energy market liberalisation and take a potential interaction between liberalisation and policy instruments into account. We find a strong and highly significant effect of environmental tax revenues, which we regard as a proxy for the extent to which energy prices changed in favour of renewable energies, as well as foreign demand for wind turbines on innovation activities. In addition, we find that price-based policy instruments are more effective in fostering innovations in the wind turbine technology when energy markets are fully open to competition. In contrast, non-price-based policy instruments such as grants or low interest rate loans are largely independent from whether or not energy markets are liberalised.</description>
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    <title>Corruption and environmental policy: An alternative perspective</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53426</link>
    <description>Title: Corruption and environmental policy: An alternative perspective
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Lapatinas, Athanasios; Litina, Anastasia; Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each activity. In this context, two self-fulfilling stable equilibria can emerge, one associated with high and another with low corruption. Corrupted politicians induce high levels of tax evasion, reducing total public funds and thus environmental protection activities. This result is in accordance with existing empirical evidence and implies that environmental policies may fail in corrupt countries where they are used as means of supporting rent seeking activities instead of protecting the environment. A higher level political authority could intervene and force the low corruption equilibrium by choosing the appropriate tax rate and, through institutional changes, the rates of peculation.</description>
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    <title>Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425</link>
    <description>Title: Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Ilkiliç, Rahmi
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.</description>
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