<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Collection: FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/268</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73032" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73031" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73030" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73029" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  <textInput>
    <title>The Collection's search engine</title>
    <description>Search the Channel</description>
    <name>search</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73032">
    <title>Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73032</link>
    <description>Title: Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dietz, Simon; Marchiori, Carmen; Tavoni, Alessandro
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a strong analogy with the behaviour of an individual or firm in other strategic contexts. In reality, however, various domestic special interests shape environmental policy, including how national governments cooperate on cross-border issues. Therefore in this paper we introduce to a classic model of international environmental cooperation the phenomenon of domestic political competition, whereby lobby groups seek to influence policy by offering to fund political campaigning. We use the model to establish some general conditions for the effects of lobbying on the stringency of policy and the size of coalitions cooperating to provide an environmental good. Using specific functional forms, we obtain a range of further results, including circumstances in which the omission of lobbying results in environmental protection being underestimated.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73031">
    <title>Bioenergy and CO2 sequestration: Climate policies beyond technological constraints</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73031</link>
    <description>Title: Bioenergy and CO2 sequestration: Climate policies beyond technological constraints
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bibas, Ruben; Méjean, Aurélie
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper examines the role of electricity production from biomass with and without carbon capture and storage in sustaining low CO2 emission pathways to 2100. It quantifies the effect of the availability of biomass resources and technologies within a general equilibrium framework. Biomass-fed integrated gasification combined cycle technology is introduced into the electricity module of IMACLIM-R, a hybrid general equilibrium model. We assess the robustness of this technology, with and without carbon capture and storage, as a way of reaching the 550 ppm stabilization target. The impact of a uniform CO2 tax on energy prices and world GDP is examined, together with the structure of the electricity mix. The influence of additional climate mitigation policies, such as alternative recycling of tax revenues and infrastructure policies is also discussed.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73030">
    <title>Kaldor-Verdoorn's Law and increasing returns to scale: A comparison across developed countries</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73030</link>
    <description>Title: Kaldor-Verdoorn's Law and increasing returns to scale: A comparison across developed countries
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Millemaci, Emanuele; Ofria, Ferdinando
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The objective of this study is to investigate the validity of the Kaldor-Verdoorn's Law in explaining the long run determinants of the labor productivity growth for the manufacturing sector of some developed economies (Western European Countries, Australia, Canada, Japan and United States). We consider the period 1973-2006 using data provided by the European Commission - Economics and Financial Affairs. Our findings suggest that the law is valid for the manufacturing as countries show increasing returns to scale. Capital growth and labor cost growth do not appear important in explaining productivity growth. The estimated Verdoorn coefficients are found to be substantially stable throughout the period.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73029">
    <title>Multicultural cities, communication and transportation improvements: An empirical analysis for Italy</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73029</link>
    <description>Title: Multicultural cities, communication and transportation improvements: An empirical analysis for Italy
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Cattaneo, Cristina
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The paper investigates the determinants of cosmopolitan cities. The hypothesis tested empirically is whether gradual improvements in distant communication boost the generation of ethnically heterogeneous cities. Consequently to easier communication, movers increasingly rely on an enlarged community for identity transmission, rather than on localized peer effects of segregated environment. The empirical estimation provides support to the prediction of the model. A better access to the airports as well as improvements in internet communications are found to increase city ethnic diversity.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

