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    <title>EconStor Community: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand</title>
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    <title>Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74824</link>
    <description>Title: Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We study the bilateral exchange of information in the context of linear quadratic games. An information structure is here represented by a non directed network, whose nodes are agents and whose links represent sharing agreements. We first study the equilibrium use of information in any given sharing network, finding that the extent to which a piece of information is public affects the equilibrium use of it, in line with previous results in the literature. We then study the incentives to share information ex-ante, highlighting the role of the elasticity of payoffs to the equilibrium volatility of one's own strategy and of one's opponents' strategies. For the case of uncorrelated signals we fully characterize pairwise stable networks for the general linear quadratic game. For the case of correlated signals, we study pair-wise stable networks for three specific linear quadratic games - Cournot oligopoly, Keynes beauty contest and Public good provision - in which strategies are substitute, complement and orthogonal, respectively. We show that signals correlation favors the transmission of information, but may also prevent all information from being transmitted.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74823">
    <title>Clean and Dirty International Technology Diffusion</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74823</link>
    <description>Title: Clean and Dirty International Technology Diffusion
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bosetti, Valentina; Verdolini, Elena
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper investigates the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection and Environmental Policies (EPs) on clean (renewable) and dirty (fossil-based) technology diffusion from top-innovators. IPR protection and EPs are extensively debated policy tools, as IPR protection addresses knowledge market failure, while EPs respond to pressing local and global environmental externalities. A model of monopolistic competition inspired by the recent trade literature shows that the profits associated with exporting a blueprint are a function of the quality of the idea and of market and institutional characteristics of the receiving country. We test the empirical implications of our model using patent data in renewable and fossil efficient power technologies for 13 top innovating countries and 40 patenting authorities. We improve on previous contributions by accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and for the endogeneity of policy proxies through a Generalized Method of Moment estimator. We show that knowledge transfer through patent duplication increases with the level of IPR protection, but with slight diminishing marginal returns. The effect is stronger for clean technologies, which are arguably less mature and more sensitive to uncertainty. Commitment to EPs also increases the incentives for patent duplication. The magnitude of the effect is conditional on the nature of the technology and on the specific policy instrument.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74822">
    <title>Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74822</link>
    <description>Title: Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Manousi, Vasiliki; Xepapadeas, Anastasios
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We couple a spatially homogeneous energy balance climate model with an economic growth model which incorporates two potential policies against climate change: mitigation, which is the traditional policy, and geoengineering. We analyze the optimal policy mix of geoengineering and mitigation in both a cooperative and a noncooperative framework, in which we study open loop and feedback solutions. Our results suggests that greenhouse gas accumulation is relatively higher when geoengineering policies are undertaken, and that at noncooperative solutions incentives for geoengineering are relative stronger. A disruption of geoengineering efforts at a steady state will cause an upward jump in global temperature.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74821">
    <title>Waste Prevention and Social Preferences: The Role of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74821</link>
    <description>Title: Waste Prevention and Social Preferences: The Role of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Cecere, Grazia; Mancinelli, Susanna; Mazzanti, Massimiliano
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Though reduction is at the top of the waste management hierarchy, EU policies have historically introduced waste management incentives mainly concerning waste recovery and recycling, in addition to actions aimed at reducing disposal in landfills. Only very recently have EU policies started defining targets for waste reduction. Against this backdrop, we aim to examine whether individual behavior towards waste reduction is more strongly driven by extrinsic motivations such as social norms, or intrinsic motivations such as purely altruistic preferences. We exploit a large new survey that covers thousands of individuals for the EU27, to test the role of motivations when people are faced with collective management of the public good. We find that diverse motivations are behind the reduction of food waste: extrinsic motivations nevertheless increase the likelihood of producing more waste. Green consumption / recycling-oriented attitudes and individualistic thinking about waste management relate to waste producers. This shows that in order to go beyond a recycling-oriented society towards reduction of the source of waste externality  its generation  the nature of social preferences matters. Behavior patterns leading to waste reduction are less socially oriented, less exposed to peer pressure and more reliant upon purely altruistic social attitudes. Policy makers should learn from the relevant insights on social behavior we here address if our societies aim to fully integrate the idea of waste reduction alongside recycling in the future.</description>
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